[{"_1":2,"_3":-5,"_4":-5},"loaderData",{"_5":6,"_7":8,"_9":10},"actionData","errors","root",{"_171":172,"_173":174},"routes/_app.x.$handle.$name",{"_100":99,"_32":45,"_108":90,"_27":109,"_13":14,"_110":-5,"_11":111,"_112":113,"_114":115,"_116":117,"_118":119,"_20":-5,"_120":-5,"_121":-5,"_122":25,"_123":124,"_125":59,"_126":-5,"_127":-5,"_128":129},"routes/_app.x.$handle.$name.branch.$branch.version.$version.diff",{"_11":12,"_13":14,"_15":16,"_17":-5,"_18":-5},"project",{"_43":44,"_32":45,"_38":46,"_47":-5,"_48":25,"_49":50,"_51":50,"_52":53,"_54":-5,"_18":55,"_56":57,"_58":59,"_60":-5,"_61":-5,"_62":63,"_64":65,"_66":67,"_68":69,"_70":71,"_72":-5,"_73":74,"_75":74,"_76":77,"_78":77,"_79":77,"_80":74,"_81":74,"_82":83,"_84":85,"_86":87,"_88":25},"version",16,"changes",[19],"aiChatInfo","userId",{"_20":21,"_22":23,"_24":25,"_26":25,"_27":28,"_29":28},"file",{"_30":31,"_32":28,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_38":39,"_40":14,"_41":42,"_24":25},"previous",{"_30":31,"_32":28,"_33":34,"_35":36},"deleted",false,"deletedHere","path","main2.ts","latestPath","fileId","331ee7e6-8152-11f1-aba0-1607ee4eb77e","name","fileType","http","content","// bridge.ts — Val Town HTTP val. Public MCP relay over a SQLite job queue.\n//\n// Neither side can accept an inbound connection: the local machine is\n// behind NAT with no forwarded ports, and Val Town has no persistent\n// process to hold a socket open. So the queue is the protocol. MCP clients\n// POST to /mcp/:channel and block until a local agent — which only ever\n// makes outbound calls — claims the row and posts a result back.\n//\n// No tool registry lives here. Every method except the initialized\n// notification is forwarded verbatim; the local agent's backend is the\n// only source of truth for what tools exist.\n//\n// OAUTH LAYER: claude.ai's custom-connector flow requires the target to\n// behave as an OAuth 2.1 authorization server with PKCE and Dynamic Client\n// Registration — a bare static bearer token isn't an accepted auth mode\n// for connectors added by URL. /register (DCR) always succeeds — client_id\n// isn't a security boundary here, PKCE is. /authorize is a one-field form\n// gated by a key that must resolve to either the admin CLIENT_TOKEN or an\n// approved registrant's personal access token. /token exchanges a\n// PKCE-verified code for whichever of those keys was actually authorized,\n// so /mcp's bearer check just has to look that token up — nothing needs a\n// second parallel auth path.\n//\n// REGISTRATION LAYER: Val Town Free can only email the account owner, not\n// arbitrary registrants, so this can't be a self-serve signup. Instead:\n// visiting / in a browser shows a request-access form; submissions are\n// validated server-side, written to SQLite regardless of outcome, and\n// emailed to the owner with one-click approve/deny links. Approval mints a\n// per-registrant token that only that person's email is on record for;\n// there is no path that hands out access without a row in the database\n// documenting who asked for it, when, from what IP, and why.\n\nimport { Hono } from \"npm:hono\";\nimport { sqlite } from \"https://esm.town/v/std/sqlite/main.ts\";\nimport { email } from \"https://esm.town/v/std/email\";\n\nconst CLIENT_TOKEN = requireEnv(\"BRIDGE_CLIENT_TOKEN\"); // admin/master key\nconst WORKER_TOKEN = requireEnv(\"BRIDGE_WORKER_TOKEN\"); // local agent key\nconst ADMIN_KEY = requireEnv(\"ADMIN_KEY\"); // gates /admin/* approve/deny/dashboard\n\nconst DEFAULT_CHANNEL = \"default\";\nconst REQUEST_TTL_MS = 120_000;\nconst OAUTH_CODE_TTL_MS = 60_000;\nconst APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60_000;\nconst APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_MAX = 5;\n\n// Val Town execution timeout: 60s (Free) / 600s (Pro) per single val run.\n// Held under the shorter ceiling so requests always resolve cleanly.\nconst CLIENT_MAX_WAIT_MS = 55_000;\nconst CLIENT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 250;\n\nconst WORKER_POLL_WINDOW_MS = 25_000;\nconst WORKER_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 500;\n\n// Streaming push is self-bounded well under the execution ceiling because\n// it's undocumented whether that ceiling applies to a chunked response the\n// same way it applies to a normal one — this is safe either way.\nconst STREAM_MAX_MS = 50_000;\nconst STREAM_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 200;\nconst STREAM_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = 10_000;\n\nfunction requireEnv(key: string): string {\n const v = Deno.env.get(key);\n if (!v) throw new Error(`Missing required environment variable: ${key}`);\n return v;\n}\n\nawait sqlite.execute(`\n CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mcp_bridge_requests (\n id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n channel TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'default',\n method TEXT NOT NULL,\n params TEXT NOT NULL,\n status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending', -- pending | claimed | done\n result TEXT,\n error TEXT,\n created_at INTEGER NOT NULL\n )\n`);\nawait sqlite.execute(\n `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_bridge_channel_status ON mcp_bridge_requests(channel, status, created_at)`,\n);\n\nawait sqlite.execute(`\n CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oauth_codes (\n code TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,\n code_challenge TEXT NOT NULL,\n granted_token TEXT NOT NULL,\n created_at INTEGER NOT NULL\n )\n`);\n\nawait sqlite.execute(`\n CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS registrations (\n id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n email TEXT NOT NULL,\n name TEXT NOT NULL,\n reason TEXT NOT NULL,\n status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending', -- pending | approved | denied | revoked\n access_token TEXT,\n ip TEXT NOT NULL,\n user_agent TEXT NOT NULL,\n created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n decided_at INTEGER\n )\n`);\nawait sqlite.execute(\n `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_registrations_email_status ON registrations(email, status)`,\n);\n\nconst sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\nconst rpcResult = (id: unknown, result: unknown) => ({\n jsonrpc: \"2.0\",\n id,\n result,\n});\nconst rpcError = (id: unknown, code: number, message: string) => ({\n jsonrpc: \"2.0\",\n id,\n error: { code, message },\n});\nconst bearer = (req: Request) =>\n (req.headers.get(\"authorization\") ?? \"\").match(/^Bearer (.+)$/)?.[1] ?? null;\nconst clientIp = (c: any) =>\n (c.req.header(\"x-forwarded-for\") ?? \"unknown\").split(\",\")[0].trim();\n\nfunction escapeHtml(s: string): string {\n return s.replace(\n /[&<>\"']/g,\n (\n ch,\n ) => ({\n \"&\": \"&\",\n \"<\": \"<\",\n \">\": \">\",\n '\"': \""\",\n \"'\": \"'\",\n }[ch]!),\n );\n}\n\nasync function sha256Base64Url(input: string): Promise {\n const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(\n \"SHA-256\",\n new TextEncoder().encode(input),\n );\n return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(digest))).replace(\n /\\+/g,\n \"-\",\n ).replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\nfunction randomToken(): string {\n const bytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));\n return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...bytes)).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(\n /\\//g,\n \"_\",\n ).replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\nasync function purgeExpired() {\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `DELETE FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE status != 'done' AND created_at < ?`,\n args: [Date.now() - REQUEST_TTL_MS],\n });\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `DELETE FROM oauth_codes WHERE created_at < ?`,\n args: [Date.now() - OAUTH_CODE_TTL_MS],\n });\n}\n\n// A key is valid if it's the admin master key, or it's an approved\n// registrant's personal token. Revoking a registration (status != 'approved')\n// takes effect immediately because this is a live lookup, not a cache.\nasync function resolveToken(key: string | null): Promise {\n if (!key) return false;\n if (key === CLIENT_TOKEN) return true;\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `SELECT 1 FROM registrations WHERE access_token = ? AND status = 'approved'`,\n args: [key],\n });\n return rows.length > 0;\n}\n\n// ── job queue ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n// Atomic claim: the UPDATE...WHERE...RETURNING is one SQLite statement, so\n// concurrent pollers/streamers can never claim the same row.\nasync function claimOne(\n channel: string,\n): Promise<\n { id: string; method: string; params: Record } | null\n> {\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `UPDATE mcp_bridge_requests SET status = 'claimed'\n WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE channel = ? AND status = 'pending' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1)\n RETURNING id, method, params`,\n args: [channel],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n const row = rows[0] as any as { id: string; method: string; params: string };\n return { id: row.id, method: row.method, params: JSON.parse(row.params) };\n}\n\nasync function enqueue(\n channel: string,\n method: string,\n params: Record,\n): Promise {\n const id = crypto.randomUUID();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `INSERT INTO mcp_bridge_requests (id, channel, method, params, status, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?)`,\n args: [id, channel, method, JSON.stringify(params), Date.now()],\n });\n return id;\n}\n\n// Blocks until the row lands in 'done' or CLIENT_MAX_WAIT_MS elapses.\nasync function dispatch(\n channel: string,\n method: string,\n params: Record,\n) {\n const id = await enqueue(channel, method, params);\n const deadline = Date.now() + CLIENT_MAX_WAIT_MS;\n\n while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `SELECT result, error FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE id = ? AND status = 'done'`,\n args: [id],\n });\n if (rows.length > 0) {\n const row = rows[0] as any as {\n result: string | null;\n error: string | null;\n };\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `DELETE FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE id = ?`,\n args: [id],\n });\n return {\n result: row.result != null ? JSON.parse(row.result) : undefined,\n error: row.error ?? undefined,\n };\n }\n await sleep(CLIENT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);\n }\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `DELETE FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE id = ?`,\n args: [id],\n });\n return null;\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcRequest {\n jsonrpc: \"2.0\";\n id?: string | number | null;\n method: string;\n params?: Record;\n}\n\nasync function handleRpc(channel: string, req: JsonRpcRequest) {\n const { id, method, params = {} } = req;\n\n if (method === \"notifications/initialized\") {\n await enqueue(channel, method, params); // fire-and-forget: no response expected\n return null;\n }\n\n const outcome = await dispatch(channel, method, params);\n if (outcome === null) {\n return rpcError(\n id,\n -32001,\n `Timed out waiting for the local agent on channel '${channel}' to answer '${method}'.`,\n );\n }\n return outcome.error\n ? rpcError(id, -32000, outcome.error)\n : rpcResult(id, outcome.result);\n}\n\nconst app = new Hono();\n\nasync function handleMcpPost(c: any, channel: string) {\n if (!(await resolveToken(bearer(c.req.raw)))) {\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n c.header(\n \"WWW-Authenticate\",\n `Bearer resource_metadata=\"${origin}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\"`,\n );\n return c.json(rpcError(null, -32000, \"Unauthorized\"), 401);\n }\n await purgeExpired();\n\n let body: JsonRpcRequest | JsonRpcRequest[];\n try {\n body = await c.req.json();\n } catch {\n return c.json(rpcError(null, -32700, \"Parse error\"), 400);\n }\n\n const batch = Array.isArray(body) ? body : [body];\n const responses = (await Promise.all(batch.map((r) => handleRpc(channel, r))))\n .filter((r) => r !== null);\n\n if (responses.length === 0) return c.body(null, 202);\n return c.json(Array.isArray(body) ? responses : responses[0]);\n}\n\napp.post(\"/mcp\", (c) => handleMcpPost(c, DEFAULT_CHANNEL));\napp.post(\"/mcp/:channel\", (c) => handleMcpPost(c, c.req.param(\"channel\")));\napp.get(\n \"/mcp\",\n (c) => c.json({ error: \"POST only — no SSE client transport.\" }, 405),\n);\n\nasync function handlePoll(c: any, channel: string) {\n if (bearer(c.req.raw) !== WORKER_TOKEN) return c.body(null, 401);\n const deadline = Date.now() + WORKER_POLL_WINDOW_MS;\n while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n const job = await claimOne(channel);\n if (job) return c.json(job);\n await sleep(WORKER_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);\n }\n return c.body(null, 204);\n}\napp.get(\"/poll\", (c) => handlePoll(c, DEFAULT_CHANNEL));\napp.get(\"/poll/:channel\", (c) => handlePoll(c, c.req.param(\"channel\")));\n\nfunction handleStream(c: any, channel: string) {\n if (bearer(c.req.raw) !== WORKER_TOKEN) return c.body(null, 401);\n\n const stream = new ReadableStream({\n async start(controller) {\n const encoder = new TextEncoder();\n const deadline = Date.now() + STREAM_MAX_MS;\n let lastHeartbeat = Date.now();\n try {\n while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n const job = await claimOne(channel);\n if (job) {\n controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(JSON.stringify(job) + \"\\n\"));\n continue;\n }\n if (Date.now() - lastHeartbeat > STREAM_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS) {\n controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(\"\\n\")); // keeps intermediaries from buffering the whole stream\n lastHeartbeat = Date.now();\n }\n await sleep(STREAM_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS);\n }\n } catch {\n // client disconnected — no job was left half-claimed, nothing to clean up\n } finally {\n controller.close();\n }\n },\n });\n\n return new Response(stream, {\n headers: {\n \"content-type\": \"application/x-ndjson\",\n \"cache-control\": \"no-store\",\n },\n });\n}\napp.get(\"/stream\", (c) => handleStream(c, DEFAULT_CHANNEL));\napp.get(\"/stream/:channel\", (c) => handleStream(c, c.req.param(\"channel\")));\n\napp.post(\"/respond\", async (c) => {\n if (bearer(c.req.raw) !== WORKER_TOKEN) return c.body(null, 401);\n const { id, result, error } = await c.req.json() as {\n id: string;\n result?: unknown;\n error?: string;\n };\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `UPDATE mcp_bridge_requests SET status = 'done', result = ?, error = ? WHERE id = ?`,\n args: [\n result !== undefined ? JSON.stringify(result) : null,\n error ?? null,\n id,\n ],\n });\n return c.body(null, 204);\n});\n\napp.get(\"/health\", async (c) => {\n await purgeExpired();\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT channel, COUNT(*) as stuck FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE status != 'done' GROUP BY channel`,\n );\n return c.json({ ok: rows.length === 0, stuck: rows });\n});\n\n// ── OAuth 2.1 authorization server ──────────────────────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\", (c) => {\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n return c.json({\n issuer: origin,\n authorization_endpoint: `${origin}/authorize`,\n token_endpoint: `${origin}/token`,\n registration_endpoint: `${origin}/register`,\n response_types_supported: [\"code\"],\n grant_types_supported: [\"authorization_code\", \"refresh_token\"],\n code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"],\n token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [\"none\"],\n });\n});\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\", (c) => {\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n return c.json({\n resource: origin,\n authorization_servers: [origin],\n bearer_methods_supported: [\"header\"],\n });\n});\n\n// DCR: client_id isn't a security boundary for this AS (PKCE is), so\n// registration always succeeds and nothing is persisted.\napp.post(\"/register\", async (c) => {\n let body: Record = {};\n try {\n body = await c.req.json();\n } catch { /* empty registration request is fine */ }\n return c.json({\n client_id: crypto.randomUUID(),\n client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n redirect_uris: body.redirect_uris ?? [],\n token_endpoint_auth_method: \"none\",\n grant_types: [\"authorization_code\", \"refresh_token\"],\n response_types: [\"code\"],\n }, 201);\n});\n\nconst AUTHORIZE_FIELDS = [\n \"response_type\",\n \"client_id\",\n \"redirect_uri\",\n \"code_challenge\",\n \"code_challenge_method\",\n \"state\",\n \"resource\",\n] as const;\n\nfunction renderAuthorizeForm(\n q: Record,\n error: string | null,\n): string {\n const hidden = AUTHORIZE_FIELDS\n .map((\n k,\n ) => (q[k] !== undefined\n ? ``\n : \"\")\n )\n .join(\"\\n\");\n return `\n

valtown-mcp-bridge authorization

\n${error ? `

${escapeHtml(error)}

` : \"\"}\n\n

No key? Request access.

\n`;\n}\n\napp.get(\"/authorize\", (c) => c.html(renderAuthorizeForm(c.req.query(), null)));\n\napp.post(\"/authorize\", async (c) => {\n const body = await c.req.parseBody() as Record;\n\n if (!(await resolveToken(body.key))) {\n return c.html(\n renderAuthorizeForm(body, \"Incorrect or unapproved key.\"),\n 401,\n );\n }\n if (body.response_type !== \"code\") {\n return c.html(\n renderAuthorizeForm(body, \"Only response_type=code is supported.\"),\n 400,\n );\n }\n if (body.code_challenge_method !== \"S256\") {\n return c.html(\n renderAuthorizeForm(body, \"Only PKCE S256 is supported.\"),\n 400,\n );\n }\n\n const redirectUri = body.redirect_uri ?? \"\";\n if (\n !/^https:\\/\\//.test(redirectUri) &&\n !/^http:\\/\\/(localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1)(:\\d+)?\\//.test(redirectUri)\n ) {\n return c.html(renderAuthorizeForm(body, \"Unrecognized redirect_uri.\"), 400);\n }\n if (!body.code_challenge) {\n return c.html(renderAuthorizeForm(body, \"Missing code_challenge.\"), 400);\n }\n\n const code = crypto.randomUUID();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `INSERT INTO oauth_codes (code, redirect_uri, code_challenge, granted_token, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,\n args: [code, redirectUri, body.code_challenge, body.key, Date.now()],\n });\n\n const dest = new URL(redirectUri);\n dest.searchParams.set(\"code\", code);\n if (body.state) dest.searchParams.set(\"state\", body.state);\n return c.redirect(dest.toString(), 302);\n});\n\napp.post(\"/token\", async (c) => {\n let params: Record = {};\n try {\n params = await c.req.parseBody() as Record;\n } catch {\n try {\n params = await c.req.json();\n } catch {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\" }, 400);\n }\n }\n\n if (params.grant_type === \"authorization_code\") {\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `SELECT redirect_uri, code_challenge, granted_token, created_at FROM oauth_codes WHERE code = ?`,\n args: [params.code ?? \"\"],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_grant\",\n error_description: \"unknown or already-used code\",\n }, 400);\n }\n\n const row = rows[0] as any as {\n redirect_uri: string;\n code_challenge: string;\n granted_token: string;\n created_at: number;\n };\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `DELETE FROM oauth_codes WHERE code = ?`,\n args: [params.code],\n }); // one-time use\n\n if (Date.now() - row.created_at > OAUTH_CODE_TTL_MS) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_grant\",\n error_description: \"code expired\",\n }, 400);\n }\n if (params.redirect_uri && params.redirect_uri !== row.redirect_uri) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_grant\",\n error_description: \"redirect_uri mismatch\",\n }, 400);\n }\n const computed = await sha256Base64Url(params.code_verifier ?? \"\");\n if (computed !== row.code_challenge) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_grant\",\n error_description: \"PKCE verification failed\",\n }, 400);\n }\n\n return c.json({\n access_token: row.granted_token,\n token_type: \"bearer\",\n expires_in: 3600,\n refresh_token: row.granted_token,\n });\n }\n\n if (params.grant_type === \"refresh_token\") {\n if (!(await resolveToken(params.refresh_token))) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\" }, 400);\n }\n return c.json({\n access_token: params.refresh_token,\n token_type: \"bearer\",\n expires_in: 3600,\n refresh_token: params.refresh_token,\n });\n }\n\n return c.json({ error: \"unsupported_grant_type\" }, 400);\n});\n\n// ── registration: request-access site ───────────────────────────────\n\ninterface ApplyValues {\n name?: string;\n email?: string;\n reason?: string;\n}\n\nfunction renderApplyPage(\n values: ApplyValues,\n message: string | null,\n isError: boolean,\n): string {\n return `\n\n

Request access — valtown-mcp-bridge

This is a private MCP relay. Access is granted manually. Fill this in and you'll hear back once it's reviewed.

\n${\n message\n ? `

${\n escapeHtml(message)\n }

`\n : \"\"\n }\n\n

Already approved? Authorize a client.

\n`;\n}\n\napp.get(\"/\", (c) => {\n if ((c.req.header(\"accept\") ?? \"\").includes(\"text/html\")) {\n return c.html(renderApplyPage({}, null, false));\n }\n return c.json({\n name: \"valtown-mcp-bridge\",\n endpoints: {\n client: [\"POST /mcp[/:channel]\"],\n agent: [\n \"GET /poll[/:channel]\",\n \"GET /stream[/:channel]\",\n \"POST /respond\",\n ],\n oauth: [\n \"GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\",\n \"GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\",\n \"POST /register\",\n \"GET|POST /authorize\",\n \"POST /token\",\n ],\n access: [\"GET / (browser: request-access form)\", \"POST /apply\"],\n },\n });\n});\n\napp.post(\"/apply\", async (c) => {\n const body = await c.req.parseBody() as Record;\n const ip = clientIp(c);\n const ua = c.req.header(\"user-agent\") ?? \"unknown\";\n\n // Honeypot: real users never populate a visually hidden field. Respond as\n // if successful — telling a bot it was rejected only teaches it to adapt —\n // but write nothing to the database or the owner's inbox.\n if (body.company) {\n return c.html(\n renderApplyPage(\n {},\n \"Request received. You'll hear back once it's reviewed.\",\n false,\n ),\n );\n }\n\n const applicantEmail = (body.email ?? \"\").trim().toLowerCase();\n const name = (body.name ?? \"\").trim();\n const reason = (body.reason ?? \"\").trim();\n\n const errors: string[] = [];\n if (\n !/^[^\\s@]+@[^\\s@]+\\.[^\\s@]+$/.test(applicantEmail) ||\n applicantEmail.length > 320\n ) errors.push(\"Enter a valid email address.\");\n if (name.length < 2 || name.length > 200) errors.push(\"Enter your name.\");\n if (reason.length < 10 || reason.length > 2000) {\n errors.push(\"Say a bit more about what you need access for.\");\n }\n if (errors.length > 0) {\n return c.html(\n renderApplyPage(\n { name, email: applicantEmail, reason },\n errors.join(\" \"),\n true,\n ),\n 400,\n );\n }\n\n await purgeExpired();\n\n const { rows: existing } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `SELECT status FROM registrations WHERE email = ? AND status IN ('pending','approved') ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1`,\n args: [applicantEmail],\n });\n if (existing.length > 0) {\n const status = (existing[0] as any as { status: string }).status;\n return c.html(\n renderApplyPage(\n {},\n status === \"approved\"\n ? \"This email already has approved access.\"\n : \"This email already has a pending request.\",\n false,\n ),\n );\n }\n\n const { rows: recent } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM registrations WHERE ip = ? AND created_at > ?`,\n args: [ip, Date.now() - APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS],\n });\n if (((recent[0] as any as { n: number }).n) >= APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_MAX) {\n return c.html(\n renderApplyPage(\n {},\n \"Too many requests from this network — try again later.\",\n true,\n ),\n 429,\n );\n }\n\n const id = crypto.randomUUID();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `INSERT INTO registrations (id, email, name, reason, status, ip, user_agent, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?)`,\n args: [id, applicantEmail, name, reason, ip, ua, Date.now()],\n });\n\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n await email({\n subject: `[mcp-bridge] access request: ${name}`,\n text: [\n `Name: ${name}`,\n `Email: ${applicantEmail}`,\n `Reason: ${reason}`,\n `IP: ${ip}`,\n `User-Agent: ${ua}`,\n ``,\n `Approve: ${origin}/admin/approve?id=${id}&key=${ADMIN_KEY}`,\n `Deny: ${origin}/admin/deny?id=${id}&key=${ADMIN_KEY}`,\n `Dashboard: ${origin}/admin?key=${ADMIN_KEY}`,\n ].join(\"\\n\"),\n }).catch((err) =>\n console.error(\"registration notification email failed:\", err)\n );\n\n return c.html(\n renderApplyPage(\n {},\n \"Request received. You'll hear back once it's reviewed.\",\n false,\n ),\n );\n});\n\n// ── admin: approve / deny / revoke / dashboard ──────────────────────\n\nfunction requireAdmin(c: any): Response | null {\n if (c.req.query(\"key\") !== ADMIN_KEY) return c.text(\"Unauthorized\", 401);\n return null;\n}\n\napp.get(\"/admin/approve\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n const token = randomToken();\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `UPDATE registrations SET status = 'approved', access_token = ?, decided_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND status = 'pending' RETURNING name, email`,\n args: [token, Date.now(), c.req.query(\"id\") ?? \"\"],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return c.text(\"Not found, or already decided.\", 404);\n\n const row = rows[0] as any as { name: string; email: string };\n return c.html(\n `\n

Approved ${escapeHtml(row.name)} <${escapeHtml(row.email)}>.

Send them this access key (it's shown once — it's also on the dashboard):

${\n      escapeHtml(token)\n    }

Back to dashboard

`,\n );\n});\n\napp.get(\"/admin/deny\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `UPDATE registrations SET status = 'denied', decided_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND status = 'pending' RETURNING name, email`,\n args: [Date.now(), c.req.query(\"id\") ?? \"\"],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return c.text(\"Not found, or already decided.\", 404);\n\n const row = rows[0] as any as { name: string; email: string };\n return c.html(\n `\n

Denied ${escapeHtml(row.name)} <${escapeHtml(row.email)}>.

Back to dashboard

`,\n );\n});\n\napp.get(\"/admin/revoke\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql:\n `UPDATE registrations SET status = 'revoked', decided_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND status = 'approved'`,\n args: [Date.now(), c.req.query(\"id\") ?? \"\"],\n });\n return c.redirect(`/admin?key=${ADMIN_KEY}`, 302);\n});\n\napp.get(\"/admin\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT id, email, name, reason, status, access_token, ip, user_agent, created_at, decided_at FROM registrations ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200`,\n );\n\n const row = (r: any) => {\n const created = new Date(r.created_at).toISOString();\n const actions = r.status === \"pending\"\n ? `approve · deny`\n : r.status === \"approved\"\n ? `${\n escapeHtml(r.access_token ?? \"\")\n } · revoke`\n : r.status;\n return `\n ${escapeHtml(created)}\n ${escapeHtml(r.name)}
${\n escapeHtml(r.email)\n }\n ${escapeHtml(r.reason)}\n ${escapeHtml(r.ip)}\n ${r.status}\n ${actions}\n `;\n };\n\n return c.html(\n `\n

valtown-mcp-bridge — registrations

\n\n\n${rows.map((r) => row(r as any)).join(\"\\n\")}\n

when	who	reason	ip	status	actions

\n`,\n );\n});\n\napp.onError((err) => Promise.reject(err));\n\nexport default app.fetch;","// bridge.ts — Val Town HTTP val. Public MCP relay over a SQLite job queue.\n//\n// Neither side can accept an inbound connection: the local machine is\n// behind NAT with no forwarded ports, and Val Town has no persistent\n// process to hold a socket open. So the queue is the protocol. MCP clients\n// POST to /mcp/:channel and block until a local agent — which only ever\n// makes outbound calls — claims the row and posts a result back.\n//\n// No tool registry lives here. Every method except the initialized\n// notification is forwarded verbatim; the local agent's backend is the\n// only source of truth for what tools exist.\n//\n// OAUTH LAYER: claude.ai's custom-connector flow requires the target to\n// behave as an OAuth 2.1 authorization server with PKCE and Dynamic Client\n// Registration — a bare static bearer token isn't an accepted auth mode\n// for connectors added by URL. /register (DCR) always succeeds — client_id\n// isn't a security boundary here, PKCE is. /authorize is a one-field form\n// gated by a key that must resolve to either the admin CLIENT_TOKEN or an\n// approved registrant's personal access token. /token exchanges a\n// PKCE-verified code for whichever of those keys was actually authorized,\n// so /mcp's bearer check just has to look that token up.\n//\n// REGISTRATION LAYER: Val Town Free can only email the account owner, not\n// arbitrary registrants, so this can't be self-serve. Visiting / in a\n// browser shows a request-access form; submissions are validated\n// server-side, written to SQLite regardless of outcome, and emailed to the\n// owner with one-click approve/deny links. Approval mints a per-registrant\n// token; there is no path that hands out access without a database row\n// documenting who asked, when, from what IP, and why.\n\nimport { Hono } from \"npm:hono\";\nimport { sqlite } from \"https://esm.town/v/std/sqlite/main.ts\";\nimport { email } from \"https://esm.town/v/std/email\";\n\nconst CLIENT_TOKEN = requireEnv(\"BRIDGE_CLIENT_TOKEN\"); // admin/master key\nconst WORKER_TOKEN = requireEnv(\"BRIDGE_WORKER_TOKEN\"); // local agent key\nconst ADMIN_KEY = requireEnv(\"ADMIN_KEY\"); // gates /admin/*\n\nconst DEFAULT_CHANNEL = \"default\";\nconst REQUEST_TTL_MS = 120_000;\nconst OAUTH_CODE_TTL_MS = 60_000;\nconst APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60_000;\nconst APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_MAX = 5;\n\n// Val Town execution timeout: 60s (Free) / 600s (Pro) per single val run.\n// Held under the shorter ceiling so requests always resolve cleanly.\nconst CLIENT_MAX_WAIT_MS = 55_000;\nconst CLIENT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 250;\n\nconst WORKER_POLL_WINDOW_MS = 25_000;\nconst WORKER_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 500;\n\n// Streaming push is self-bounded well under the execution ceiling because\n// it's undocumented whether that ceiling applies to a chunked response the\n// same way it applies to a normal one — this is safe either way.\nconst STREAM_MAX_MS = 50_000;\nconst STREAM_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS = 200;\nconst STREAM_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS = 10_000;\n\nfunction requireEnv(key: string): string {\n const v = Deno.env.get(key);\n if (!v) throw new Error(`Missing required environment variable: ${key}`);\n return v;\n}\n\nawait sqlite.execute(`\n CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mcp_bridge_requests (\n id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n channel TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'default',\n method TEXT NOT NULL,\n params TEXT NOT NULL,\n status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending', -- pending | claimed | done\n result TEXT,\n error TEXT,\n created_at INTEGER NOT NULL\n )\n`);\nawait sqlite.execute(\n `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_bridge_channel_status ON mcp_bridge_requests(channel, status, created_at)`,\n);\n\nawait sqlite.execute(`\n CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS oauth_codes (\n code TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n redirect_uri TEXT NOT NULL,\n code_challenge TEXT NOT NULL,\n granted_token TEXT NOT NULL,\n created_at INTEGER NOT NULL\n )\n`);\n\nawait sqlite.execute(`\n CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS registrations (\n id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n email TEXT NOT NULL,\n name TEXT NOT NULL,\n reason TEXT NOT NULL,\n status TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending', -- pending | approved | denied | revoked\n access_token TEXT,\n ip TEXT NOT NULL,\n user_agent TEXT NOT NULL,\n created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n decided_at INTEGER\n )\n`);\nawait sqlite.execute(\n `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_registrations_email_status ON registrations(email, status)`,\n);\n\nconst sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\nconst rpcResult = (id: unknown, result: unknown) => ({ jsonrpc: \"2.0\", id, result });\nconst rpcError = (id: unknown, code: number, message: string) => ({ jsonrpc: \"2.0\", id, error: { code, message } });\nconst bearer = (req: Request) => (req.headers.get(\"authorization\") ?? \"\").match(/^Bearer (.+)$/)?.[1] ?? null;\nconst clientIp = (c: any) => (c.req.header(\"x-forwarded-for\") ?? \"unknown\").split(\",\")[0].trim();\nconst wantsHtml = (c: any) => (c.req.header(\"accept\") ?? \"\").includes(\"text/html\");\n\nfunction escapeHtml(s: string): string {\n return s.replace(/[&<>\"']/g, (ch) => ({ \"&\": \"&\", \"<\": \"<\", \">\": \">\", '\"': \""\", \"'\": \"'\" }[ch]!));\n}\n\nasync function sha256Base64Url(input: string): Promise {\n const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", new TextEncoder().encode(input));\n return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(digest))).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\nfunction randomToken(): string {\n const bytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32));\n return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...bytes)).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\nasync function purgeExpired() {\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `DELETE FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE status != 'done' AND created_at < ?`,\n args: [Date.now() - REQUEST_TTL_MS],\n });\n await sqlite.execute({ sql: `DELETE FROM oauth_codes WHERE created_at < ?`, args: [Date.now() - OAUTH_CODE_TTL_MS] });\n}\n\n// A key is valid if it's the admin master key, or it's an approved\n// registrant's personal token. Revoking a registration takes effect\n// immediately because this is a live lookup, not a cache.\nasync function resolveToken(key: string | null): Promise {\n if (!key) return false;\n if (key === CLIENT_TOKEN) return true;\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT 1 FROM registrations WHERE access_token = ? AND status = 'approved'`,\n args: [key],\n });\n return rows.length > 0;\n}\n\n// ── shared page shell ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction layout(title: string, body: string): string {\n return `\n\n\n\n${escapeHtml(title)}\n\n

${body}

`;\n}\n\nfunction msg(text: string | null, isError: boolean): string {\n return text ? `

${escapeHtml(text)}

` : \"\";\n}\n\n// ── job queue ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n// Atomic claim: the UPDATE...WHERE...RETURNING is one SQLite statement, so\n// concurrent pollers/streamers can never claim the same row.\nasync function claimOne(channel: string): Promise<{ id: string; method: string; params: Record } | null> {\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `UPDATE mcp_bridge_requests SET status = 'claimed'\n WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE channel = ? AND status = 'pending' ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1)\n RETURNING id, method, params`,\n args: [channel],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n const row = rows[0] as any as { id: string; method: string; params: string };\n return { id: row.id, method: row.method, params: JSON.parse(row.params) };\n}\n\nasync function enqueue(channel: string, method: string, params: Record): Promise {\n const id = crypto.randomUUID();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `INSERT INTO mcp_bridge_requests (id, channel, method, params, status, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?)`,\n args: [id, channel, method, JSON.stringify(params), Date.now()],\n });\n return id;\n}\n\n// Blocks until the row lands in 'done' or CLIENT_MAX_WAIT_MS elapses.\nasync function dispatch(channel: string, method: string, params: Record) {\n const id = await enqueue(channel, method, params);\n const deadline = Date.now() + CLIENT_MAX_WAIT_MS;\n\n while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT result, error FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE id = ? AND status = 'done'`,\n args: [id],\n });\n if (rows.length > 0) {\n const row = rows[0] as any as { result: string | null; error: string | null };\n await sqlite.execute({ sql: `DELETE FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE id = ?`, args: [id] });\n return { result: row.result != null ? JSON.parse(row.result) : undefined, error: row.error ?? undefined };\n }\n await sleep(CLIENT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);\n }\n await sqlite.execute({ sql: `DELETE FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE id = ?`, args: [id] });\n return null;\n}\n\ninterface JsonRpcRequest {\n jsonrpc: \"2.0\";\n id?: string | number | null;\n method: string;\n params?: Record;\n}\n\nasync function handleRpc(channel: string, req: JsonRpcRequest) {\n const { id, method, params = {} } = req;\n\n if (method === \"notifications/initialized\") {\n await enqueue(channel, method, params); // fire-and-forget: no response expected\n return null;\n }\n\n const outcome = await dispatch(channel, method, params);\n if (outcome === null) {\n return rpcError(id, -32001, `Timed out waiting for the local agent on channel '${channel}' to answer '${method}'.`);\n }\n return outcome.error ? rpcError(id, -32000, outcome.error) : rpcResult(id, outcome.result);\n}\n\nconst app = new Hono();\n\nasync function handleMcpPost(c: any, channel: string) {\n if (!(await resolveToken(bearer(c.req.raw)))) {\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n c.header(\"WWW-Authenticate\", `Bearer resource_metadata=\"${origin}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\"`);\n return c.json(rpcError(null, -32000, \"Unauthorized\"), 401);\n }\n await purgeExpired();\n\n let body: JsonRpcRequest | JsonRpcRequest[];\n try {\n body = await c.req.json();\n } catch {\n return c.json(rpcError(null, -32700, \"Parse error\"), 400);\n }\n\n const batch = Array.isArray(body) ? body : [body];\n const responses = (await Promise.all(batch.map((r) => handleRpc(channel, r)))).filter((r) => r !== null);\n\n if (responses.length === 0) return c.body(null, 202);\n return c.json(Array.isArray(body) ? responses : responses[0]);\n}\n\napp.post(\"/mcp\", (c) => handleMcpPost(c, DEFAULT_CHANNEL));\napp.post(\"/mcp/:channel\", (c) => handleMcpPost(c, c.req.param(\"channel\")));\napp.get(\"/mcp\", (c) => c.json({ error: \"POST only — no SSE client transport.\" }, 405));\n\nasync function handlePoll(c: any, channel: string) {\n if (bearer(c.req.raw) !== WORKER_TOKEN) return c.body(null, 401);\n const deadline = Date.now() + WORKER_POLL_WINDOW_MS;\n while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n const job = await claimOne(channel);\n if (job) return c.json(job);\n await sleep(WORKER_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);\n }\n return c.body(null, 204);\n}\napp.get(\"/poll\", (c) => handlePoll(c, DEFAULT_CHANNEL));\napp.get(\"/poll/:channel\", (c) => handlePoll(c, c.req.param(\"channel\")));\n\nfunction handleStream(c: any, channel: string) {\n if (bearer(c.req.raw) !== WORKER_TOKEN) return c.body(null, 401);\n\n const stream = new ReadableStream({\n async start(controller) {\n const encoder = new TextEncoder();\n const deadline = Date.now() + STREAM_MAX_MS;\n let lastHeartbeat = Date.now();\n try {\n while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n const job = await claimOne(channel);\n if (job) {\n controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(JSON.stringify(job) + \"\\n\"));\n continue;\n }\n if (Date.now() - lastHeartbeat > STREAM_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS) {\n controller.enqueue(encoder.encode(\"\\n\")); // keeps intermediaries from buffering the whole stream\n lastHeartbeat = Date.now();\n }\n await sleep(STREAM_CHECK_INTERVAL_MS);\n }\n } catch {\n // client disconnected — no job was left half-claimed, nothing to clean up\n } finally {\n controller.close();\n }\n },\n });\n\n return new Response(stream, { headers: { \"content-type\": \"application/x-ndjson\", \"cache-control\": \"no-store\" } });\n}\napp.get(\"/stream\", (c) => handleStream(c, DEFAULT_CHANNEL));\napp.get(\"/stream/:channel\", (c) => handleStream(c, c.req.param(\"channel\")));\n\napp.post(\"/respond\", async (c) => {\n if (bearer(c.req.raw) !== WORKER_TOKEN) return c.body(null, 401);\n const { id, result, error } = await c.req.json() as { id: string; result?: unknown; error?: string };\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `UPDATE mcp_bridge_requests SET status = 'done', result = ?, error = ? WHERE id = ?`,\n args: [result !== undefined ? JSON.stringify(result) : null, error ?? null, id],\n });\n return c.body(null, 204);\n});\n\napp.get(\"/health\", async (c) => {\n await purgeExpired();\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT channel, COUNT(*) as stuck FROM mcp_bridge_requests WHERE status != 'done' GROUP BY channel`,\n );\n return c.json({ ok: rows.length === 0, stuck: rows });\n});\n\n// ── OAuth 2.1 authorization server ──────────────────────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\", (c) => {\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n return c.json({\n issuer: origin,\n authorization_endpoint: `${origin}/authorize`,\n token_endpoint: `${origin}/token`,\n registration_endpoint: `${origin}/register`,\n response_types_supported: [\"code\"],\n grant_types_supported: [\"authorization_code\", \"refresh_token\"],\n code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"],\n token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [\"none\"],\n });\n});\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\", (c) => {\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n return c.json({ resource: origin, authorization_servers: [origin], bearer_methods_supported: [\"header\"] });\n});\n\n// DCR: client_id isn't a security boundary for this AS (PKCE is), so\n// registration always succeeds and nothing is persisted.\napp.post(\"/register\", async (c) => {\n let body: Record = {};\n try {\n body = await c.req.json();\n } catch { /* empty registration request is fine */ }\n return c.json({\n client_id: crypto.randomUUID(),\n client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n redirect_uris: body.redirect_uris ?? [],\n token_endpoint_auth_method: \"none\",\n grant_types: [\"authorization_code\", \"refresh_token\"],\n response_types: [\"code\"],\n }, 201);\n});\n\nconst AUTHORIZE_FIELDS = [\n \"response_type\", \"client_id\", \"redirect_uri\", \"code_challenge\", \"code_challenge_method\", \"state\", \"resource\",\n] as const;\n\nfunction renderAuthorizePage(q: Record, error: string | null): string {\n const hidden = AUTHORIZE_FIELDS\n .map((k) => (q[k] !== undefined ? `` : \"\"))\n .join(\"\\n\");\n return layout(\"Authorize — valtown-mcp-bridge\", `\n

Authorize access

Enter your access key to connect this client.

\n ${msg(error, true)}\n \n `);\n}\n\napp.get(\"/authorize\", (c) => c.html(renderAuthorizePage(c.req.query(), null)));\n\napp.post(\"/authorize\", async (c) => {\n const body = await c.req.parseBody() as Record;\n\n if (!(await resolveToken(body.key))) return c.html(renderAuthorizePage(body, \"Incorrect or unapproved key.\"), 401);\n if (body.response_type !== \"code\") return c.html(renderAuthorizePage(body, \"Only response_type=code is supported.\"), 400);\n if (body.code_challenge_method !== \"S256\") return c.html(renderAuthorizePage(body, \"Only PKCE S256 is supported.\"), 400);\n\n const redirectUri = body.redirect_uri ?? \"\";\n if (!/^https:\\/\\//.test(redirectUri) && !/^http:\\/\\/(localhost|127\\.0\\.0\\.1)(:\\d+)?\\//.test(redirectUri)) {\n return c.html(renderAuthorizePage(body, \"Unrecognized redirect_uri.\"), 400);\n }\n if (!body.code_challenge) return c.html(renderAuthorizePage(body, \"Missing code_challenge.\"), 400);\n\n const code = crypto.randomUUID();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `INSERT INTO oauth_codes (code, redirect_uri, code_challenge, granted_token, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,\n args: [code, redirectUri, body.code_challenge, body.key, Date.now()],\n });\n\n const dest = new URL(redirectUri);\n dest.searchParams.set(\"code\", code);\n if (body.state) dest.searchParams.set(\"state\", body.state);\n return c.redirect(dest.toString(), 302);\n});\n\napp.post(\"/token\", async (c) => {\n let params: Record = {};\n try {\n params = await c.req.parseBody() as Record;\n } catch {\n try {\n params = await c.req.json();\n } catch {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\" }, 400);\n }\n }\n\n if (params.grant_type === \"authorization_code\") {\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT redirect_uri, code_challenge, granted_token, created_at FROM oauth_codes WHERE code = ?`,\n args: [params.code ?? \"\"],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"unknown or already-used code\" }, 400);\n\n const row = rows[0] as any as { redirect_uri: string; code_challenge: string; granted_token: string; created_at: number };\n await sqlite.execute({ sql: `DELETE FROM oauth_codes WHERE code = ?`, args: [params.code] }); // one-time use\n\n if (Date.now() - row.created_at > OAUTH_CODE_TTL_MS) return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"code expired\" }, 400);\n if (params.redirect_uri && params.redirect_uri !== row.redirect_uri) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"redirect_uri mismatch\" }, 400);\n }\n const computed = await sha256Base64Url(params.code_verifier ?? \"\");\n if (computed !== row.code_challenge) return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"PKCE verification failed\" }, 400);\n\n return c.json({ access_token: row.granted_token, token_type: \"bearer\", expires_in: 3600, refresh_token: row.granted_token });\n }\n\n if (params.grant_type === \"refresh_token\") {\n if (!(await resolveToken(params.refresh_token))) return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\" }, 400);\n return c.json({ access_token: params.refresh_token, token_type: \"bearer\", expires_in: 3600, refresh_token: params.refresh_token });\n }\n\n return c.json({ error: \"unsupported_grant_type\" }, 400);\n});\n\n// ── registration: request-access site ───────────────────────────────\n\ninterface ApplyValues {\n name?: string;\n email?: string;\n reason?: string;\n}\n\nfunction renderApplyPage(values: ApplyValues, note: string | null, isError: boolean): string {\n return layout(\"Request access — valtown-mcp-bridge\", `\n

Request access

This is a private MCP relay. Access is granted manually — submit this and you'll hear back once it's reviewed.

\n ${msg(note, isError)}\n \n `);\n}\n\napp.get(\"/\", (c) => {\n if (wantsHtml(c)) return c.html(renderApplyPage({}, null, false));\n return c.json({\n name: \"valtown-mcp-bridge\",\n endpoints: {\n client: [\"POST /mcp[/:channel]\"],\n agent: [\"GET /poll[/:channel]\", \"GET /stream[/:channel]\", \"POST /respond\"],\n oauth: [\"GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\", \"GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\", \"POST /register\", \"GET|POST /authorize\", \"POST /token\"],\n access: [\"GET / (browser: request-access form)\", \"POST /apply\", \"GET /admin (browser: admin panel)\"],\n },\n });\n});\n\napp.post(\"/apply\", async (c) => {\n const body = await c.req.parseBody() as Record;\n const ip = clientIp(c);\n const ua = c.req.header(\"user-agent\") ?? \"unknown\";\n\n // Honeypot: real users never populate a visually hidden field. Respond as\n // if successful — telling a bot it was rejected only teaches it to adapt —\n // but write nothing to the database or the owner's inbox.\n if (body.company) return c.html(renderApplyPage({}, \"Request received. You'll hear back once it's reviewed.\", false));\n\n const applicantEmail = (body.email ?? \"\").trim().toLowerCase();\n const name = (body.name ?? \"\").trim();\n const reason = (body.reason ?? \"\").trim();\n\n const errors: string[] = [];\n if (!/^[^\\s@]+@[^\\s@]+\\.[^\\s@]+$/.test(applicantEmail) || applicantEmail.length > 320) errors.push(\"Enter a valid email address.\");\n if (name.length < 2 || name.length > 200) errors.push(\"Enter your name.\");\n if (reason.length < 10 || reason.length > 2000) errors.push(\"Say a bit more about what you need access for.\");\n if (errors.length > 0) return c.html(renderApplyPage({ name, email: applicantEmail, reason }, errors.join(\" \"), true), 400);\n\n await purgeExpired();\n\n const { rows: existing } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT status FROM registrations WHERE email = ? AND status IN ('pending','approved') ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1`,\n args: [applicantEmail],\n });\n if (existing.length > 0) {\n const status = (existing[0] as any as { status: string }).status;\n return c.html(renderApplyPage({}, status === \"approved\" ? \"This email already has approved access.\" : \"This email already has a pending request.\", false));\n }\n\n const { rows: recent } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT COUNT(*) as n FROM registrations WHERE ip = ? AND created_at > ?`,\n args: [ip, Date.now() - APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS],\n });\n if (((recent[0] as any as { n: number }).n) >= APPLY_RATE_LIMIT_MAX) {\n return c.html(renderApplyPage({}, \"Too many requests from this network — try again later.\", true), 429);\n }\n\n const id = crypto.randomUUID();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `INSERT INTO registrations (id, email, name, reason, status, ip, user_agent, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?)`,\n args: [id, applicantEmail, name, reason, ip, ua, Date.now()],\n });\n\n const origin = new URL(c.req.url).origin;\n await email({\n subject: `[mcp-bridge] access request: ${name}`,\n text: [\n `Name: ${name}`,\n `Email: ${applicantEmail}`,\n `Reason: ${reason}`,\n `IP: ${ip}`,\n `User-Agent: ${ua}`,\n ``,\n `Approve: ${origin}/admin/approve?id=${id}&key=${ADMIN_KEY}`,\n `Deny: ${origin}/admin/deny?id=${id}&key=${ADMIN_KEY}`,\n `Dashboard: ${origin}/admin?key=${ADMIN_KEY}`,\n ].join(\"\\n\"),\n }).catch((err) => console.error(\"registration notification email failed:\", err));\n\n return c.html(renderApplyPage({}, \"Request received. You'll hear back once it's reviewed.\", false));\n});\n\n// ── admin: approve / deny / revoke / dashboard ──────────────────────\n\nfunction adminLoginPage(c: any, error?: string): string {\n const params = new URLSearchParams(c.req.query());\n params.delete(\"key\");\n const hidden = [...params.entries()].map(([k, v]) => ``).join(\"\\n\");\n return layout(\"Admin — valtown-mcp-bridge\", `\n

Admin

Enter the admin key to continue.

\n ${msg(error ?? null, true)}\n `);\n}\n\nfunction requireAdmin(c: any): Response | null {\n if (c.req.query(\"key\") !== ADMIN_KEY) {\n return c.html(adminLoginPage(c, c.req.query(\"key\") ? \"Incorrect key.\" : undefined), 401);\n }\n return null;\n}\n\napp.get(\"/admin/approve\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n const token = randomToken();\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `UPDATE registrations SET status = 'approved', access_token = ?, decided_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND status = 'pending' RETURNING name, email`,\n args: [token, Date.now(), c.req.query(\"id\") ?? \"\"],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) {\n return c.html(layout(\"Admin\", `

Not found

No pending request with that id.

← Dashboard

`), 404);\n }\n\n const row = rows[0] as any as { name: string; email: string };\n return c.html(layout(\"Approved — valtown-mcp-bridge\", `\n

Approved

\n ${msg(`${row.name} <${row.email}>`, false)}\n

Send them this access key — it's shown once here, and always visible on the dashboard.

${escapeHtml(token)}

← Dashboard

`));\n});\n\napp.get(\"/admin/deny\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `UPDATE registrations SET status = 'denied', decided_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND status = 'pending' RETURNING name, email`,\n args: [Date.now(), c.req.query(\"id\") ?? \"\"],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) {\n return c.html(layout(\"Admin\", `

Not found

No pending request with that id.

← Dashboard

`), 404);\n }\n\n const row = rows[0] as any as { name: string; email: string };\n return c.html(layout(\"Denied — valtown-mcp-bridge\", `\n

Denied

\n ${msg(`${row.name} <${row.email}>`, true)}\n

← Dashboard

`));\n});\n\napp.get(\"/admin/revoke\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `UPDATE registrations SET status = 'revoked', decided_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND status = 'approved'`,\n args: [Date.now(), c.req.query(\"id\") ?? \"\"],\n });\n return c.redirect(`/admin?key=${ADMIN_KEY}`, 302);\n});\n\napp.get(\"/admin\", async (c) => {\n const denied = requireAdmin(c);\n if (denied) return denied;\n\n await purgeExpired();\n const { rows } = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT id, email, name, reason, status, access_token, ip, user_agent, created_at FROM registrations ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200`,\n );\n const counts = { pending: 0, approved: 0, denied: 0, revoked: 0 } as Record;\n for (const r of rows as any[]) counts[r.status] = (counts[r.status] ?? 0) + 1;\n\n const renderRow = (r: any) => {\n const when = new Date(r.created_at).toLocaleString();\n const actions = r.status === \"pending\"\n ? `approve · deny`\n : r.status === \"approved\"\n ? `${escapeHtml((r.access_token ?? \"\").slice(0, 16))}… · revoke`\n : `—`;\n return `\n ${escapeHtml(when)}\n ${escapeHtml(r.name)}
${escapeHtml(r.email)}\n ${escapeHtml(r.reason)}\n ${escapeHtml(r.ip)}\n ${r.status}\n ${actions}\n `;\n };\n\n const body = `\n

Registrations

${counts.pending} pending · ${counts.approved} approved · ${counts.denied} denied · ${counts.revoked} revoked

\n ${rows.length === 0 ? `

No registrations yet.

` : `\n \n \n ${(rows as any[]).map(renderRow).join(\"\\n\")}\n

When	Who	Reason	IP	Status	Actions

`}\n `;\n\n return c.html(layout(\"Admin — valtown-mcp-bridge\", body).replace('class=\"wrap\"', 'class=\"wrap wide\"'));\n});\n\n// ── fallbacks ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/favicon.ico\", (c) => c.body(null, 204));\n\napp.notFound((c) => {\n if (wantsHtml(c)) {\n return c.html(layout(\"Not found\", `

404

Nothing at this address.

← Home

`), 404);\n }\n return c.json({ error: \"Not found\" }, 404);\n});\n\napp.onError((err) => Promise.reject(err));\n\nexport default app.fetch;","createdAt",["D",1784233965676],"branchVersion","branchId","cdeeab9b-e3e2-475e-80fa-97ce96faf35a","id","3b1bbab8-3df4-4b1c-8719-adcf265363c5","mcp-bridge",["D",1784117326079],"deletedAt","legacyEnvVars","privacy","public","httpPrivacy","description","mcp bridge to local host","imageUrl","2c6d46b0-54dd-11f0-a86c-6fbc2b29331a","pinnedFileId","ee1b71f8-8045-11f1-b556-1607ee4eb77e","pinPreview",true,"pinMigrated","screenshotVersion","likeCount",0,"orgId","850db142-aa5e-4914-bceb-1e2e085ae4c5","tursoName","3b1bbab83df44b1c8719adcf265363c5","tursoHostname","3b1bbab83df44b1c8719adcf265363c5-val-town.aws-us-east-2.turso.io","tursoMeasuredAt",["D",1789558275908],"pinned","userPerm","r","valPerm","blobPerm","rw","emailPerm","sqlitePerm","projectPerm","telemetryPerm","user",{"_100":99,"_107":103},"org",{"_100":99,"_101":-5,"_102":103,"_18":55,"_104":105,"_106":25},"branch",{"_13":89,"_32":90,"_43":42,"_91":44,"_92":-5,"_93":-5,"_94":-5,"_95":-5,"_96":-5,"_97":45,"_98":99},"isOwned",26,"main","projectId","forkedBranchId","forkedBranchVersion","forkedProjectPrivacy","forkedProjectId","forkedProjectOrgId","projectName","userHandle","ziggyware","handle","displayName","avatar","https://img.clerk.com/eyJ0eXBlIjoicHJveHkiLCJzcmMiOiJodHRwczovL2ltYWdlcy5jbGVyay5kZXYvb2F1dGhfZ2l0aHViL2ltZ18yekJHRDE5SGVoUHUzUENQaXY2MTRkT3h0cncifQ","tier","free","canRestrictVals","profileImageUrl","branchName","","adoptOrgId",{"_43":44,"_32":45,"_38":166,"_47":-5,"_48":25,"_49":50,"_51":50,"_52":53,"_54":-5,"_18":55,"_56":57,"_58":59,"_60":-5,"_61":-5,"_62":63,"_64":65,"_66":67,"_68":69,"_70":167,"_72":-5,"_73":74,"_75":74,"_76":77,"_78":77,"_79":77,"_80":74,"_81":74,"_82":168,"_84":169,"_86":170,"_88":25},"tree",[157,158],"files",[157,158],"counts",{"_146":63,"_147":148,"_149":63,"_150":151,"_152":153},"contents",[130,131],"upstreamProject","upstreamBranch","emptyEnvVars","flags",[],"hasHttpFiles","grants","orgs","customDomains",{},{"_43":139,"_32":140,"_30":57,"_133":-5,"_41":42,"_40":141,"_134":59,"_38":142,"_13":143,"_33":34,"_35":144,"_24":25,"_137":45,"_27":145},{"_43":132,"_32":28,"_30":31,"_133":-5,"_41":42,"_40":14,"_134":25,"_38":135,"_13":136,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_24":25,"_137":-5,"_27":138},"b8e50017-35f7-4d0b-a4e2-6b7bbf6260b8","parentId","latest",["D",1784233965676],4,"label",[28],"c10d8cd9-0f64-4353-9325-76cd3874f427","main.ts",11,["D",1784231469679],10,"// local-agent.ts — runs on YOUR machine. Opens zero listening ports.\n//\n// Every call here is outbound to the bridge val — the only direction NAT\n// permits. One loop per configured local service (\"channel\"): each prefers\n// the bridge's streaming push endpoint and falls back to bounded polling\n// if streaming errors out repeatedly.\n//\n// Run: deno run --allow-net --allow-env local-agent.ts\n//\n// Required:\n// BRIDGE_URL https://your-username-yourval.web.val.run\n// BRIDGE_WORKER_TOKEN must match BRIDGE_WORKER_TOKEN on the val\n//\n// Local services — one of:\n// MCP_SERVICES \"name:port[:path],name:port[:path],...\"\n// e.g. \"rojs:5057:/mcp,studio:5058:/mcp\"\n// LOCAL_MCP_PORT (+ optional LOCAL_MCP_PATH, default /mcp) single service, channel \"default\"\n// LOCAL_MCP_URL single service, full URL, channel \"default\"\n//\n// Optional:\n// AGENT_TRANSPORT \"stream\" (default) or \"poll\"\n// STREAM_FAILURE_THRESHOLD consecutive stream errors before fallback (default 3)\n// STREAM_COOLDOWN_MS time spent polling before retrying stream (default 30000)\n\ninterface Service {\n channel: string;\n url: string;\n}\n\ninterface Job {\n id: string;\n method: string;\n params: Record;\n}\n\nfunction requireEnv(key: string): string {\n const v = Deno.env.get(key);\n if (!v) throw new Error(`Missing required environment variable: ${key}`);\n return v;\n}\n\nfunction loadServices(): Service[] {\n const multi = Deno.env.get(\"MCP_SERVICES\");\n if (multi) {\n return multi.split(\",\").map((entry) => {\n const [name, port, path = \"/mcp\"] = entry.trim().split(\":\");\n if (!name || !port) {\n throw new Error(\n `Malformed MCP_SERVICES entry '${entry}' — expected name:port[:path]`,\n );\n }\n return { channel: name, url: `http://localhost:${port}${path}` };\n });\n }\n const url = Deno.env.get(\"LOCAL_MCP_URL\");\n if (url) return [{ channel: \"default\", url }];\n\n const port = Deno.env.get(\"LOCAL_MCP_PORT\");\n if (port) {\n return [{\n channel: \"default\",\n url: `http://localhost:${port}${\n Deno.env.get(\"LOCAL_MCP_PATH\") ?? \"/mcp\"\n }`,\n }];\n }\n\n throw new Error(\"Set MCP_SERVICES, or LOCAL_MCP_URL, or LOCAL_MCP_PORT.\");\n}\n\nconst BRIDGE_URL = requireEnv(\"BRIDGE_URL\").replace(/\\/$/, \"\");\nconst WORKER_TOKEN = requireEnv(\"BRIDGE_WORKER_TOKEN\");\nconst SERVICES = loadServices();\nconst TRANSPORT = Deno.env.get(\"AGENT_TRANSPORT\") ?? \"stream\";\nconst STREAM_FAILURE_THRESHOLD = Number(\n Deno.env.get(\"STREAM_FAILURE_THRESHOLD\") ?? \"3\",\n);\nconst STREAM_COOLDOWN_MS = Number(\n Deno.env.get(\"STREAM_COOLDOWN_MS\") ?? \"30000\",\n);\n\nconst sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\nconst authHeaders = (channel: string, mode: string) => ({\n authorization: `Bearer ${WORKER_TOKEN}`,\n \"x-worker-id\": `${channel}-${mode}`,\n});\n\nasync function executeLocally(\n service: Service,\n job: Job,\n): Promise<{ result?: unknown; error?: string }> {\n const resp = await fetch(service.url, {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" },\n body: JSON.stringify({\n jsonrpc: \"2.0\",\n id: job.id,\n method: job.method,\n params: job.params,\n }),\n });\n if (!resp.ok) {\n return {\n error: `Local MCP server returned HTTP ${resp.status}: ${await resp\n .text()}`,\n };\n }\n const body = await resp.json() as {\n result?: unknown;\n error?: { message: string };\n };\n return body.error ? { error: body.error.message } : { result: body.result };\n}\n\nasync function respond(\n job: Job,\n outcome: { result?: unknown; error?: string },\n) {\n await fetch(`${BRIDGE_URL}/respond`, {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: {\n authorization: `Bearer ${WORKER_TOKEN}`,\n \"content-type\": \"application/json\",\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({ id: job.id, ...outcome }),\n });\n}\n\nasync function handleJob(service: Service, job: Job) {\n console.log(`[${service.channel}] ${job.id} ${job.method}`);\n const outcome = await executeLocally(service, job).catch((err) => ({\n error: `Local execution threw: ${err}`,\n }));\n await respond(job, outcome);\n}\n\nasync function pollOnce(service: Service): Promise {\n const resp = await fetch(`${BRIDGE_URL}/poll/${service.channel}`, {\n headers: authHeaders(service.channel, \"poll\"),\n });\n if (resp.status === 204) return null;\n if (!resp.ok) {\n throw new Error(\n `/poll/${service.channel} → ${resp.status}: ${await resp.text()}`,\n );\n }\n return await resp.json() as Job;\n}\n\nasync function runPollLoop(service: Service, until: number | null) {\n while (until === null || Date.now() < until) {\n try {\n const job = await pollOnce(service);\n if (job) await handleJob(service, job);\n } catch (err) {\n console.error(`[${service.channel}] poll error: ${err}`);\n await sleep(2000);\n }\n }\n}\n\n// Newline-delimited JSON job announcements over a chunked response.\n// Blank lines are heartbeats. Jobs execute concurrently with the read loop\n// so one slow tool call can't stall receipt of the next pushed job.\nasync function runStreamLoop(service: Service) {\n let failures = 0;\n\n while (true) {\n if (failures >= STREAM_FAILURE_THRESHOLD) {\n console.warn(\n `[${service.channel}] streaming failed ${failures}x — polling for ${STREAM_COOLDOWN_MS}ms`,\n );\n await runPollLoop(service, Date.now() + STREAM_COOLDOWN_MS);\n failures = 0;\n continue;\n }\n\n try {\n const resp = await fetch(`${BRIDGE_URL}/stream/${service.channel}`, {\n headers: authHeaders(service.channel, \"stream\"),\n });\n if (!resp.ok || !resp.body) {\n throw new Error(`/stream/${service.channel} → ${resp.status}`);\n }\n\n const reader = resp.body.pipeThrough(new TextDecoderStream()).getReader();\n let buffer = \"\";\n for (;;) {\n const { value, done } = await reader.read();\n if (done) break;\n buffer += value;\n let cut: number;\n while ((cut = buffer.indexOf(\"\\n\")) >= 0) {\n const line = buffer.slice(0, cut).trim();\n buffer = buffer.slice(cut + 1);\n if (line) {\n handleJob(service, JSON.parse(line)).catch((err) =>\n console.error(`[${service.channel}] job failed: ${err}`)\n );\n }\n }\n }\n failures = 0; // clean close (server-side max lifetime) — reconnect immediately\n } catch (err) {\n failures++;\n console.error(`[${service.channel}] stream error (${failures}): ${err}`);\n await sleep(Math.min(10_000, 1000 * 2 ** failures));\n }\n }\n}\n\nconsole.log(\n `[agent] ${SERVICES.map((s) => `${s.channel} -> ${s.url}`).join(\", \")}`,\n);\nawait Promise.all(\n SERVICES.map((\n s,\n ) => (TRANSPORT === \"poll\" ? runPollLoop(s, null) : runStreamLoop(s))),\n);",[140],"pulls","branches",1,"forks","envVars",{"_154":136,"_156":63},"connections",{"_154":63,"_155":63},"count","unfilledCount","emptyCount",{"_43":139,"_32":140,"_30":57,"_133":-5,"_41":42,"_40":141,"_134":59,"_38":163,"_13":143,"_33":34,"_35":144,"_24":25,"_137":45,"_160":164,"_27":165},{"_43":132,"_32":28,"_30":31,"_133":-5,"_41":42,"_40":14,"_134":25,"_38":159,"_13":136,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_24":25,"_137":-5,"_160":161,"_27":162},["D",1784233965676],"children",[],[28],["D",1784231469679],[],[140],["D",1784117326079],["D",1789558275908],{"_100":99,"_107":103},{"_100":99,"_101":-5,"_102":103,"_18":55,"_104":105,"_106":25},{"_13":89,"_32":90,"_43":42,"_91":44,"_92":-5,"_93":-5,"_94":-5,"_95":-5,"_96":-5,"_97":45,"_98":99},"ctx",{"_82":-5,"_127":204,"_205":206,"_207":208,"_209":25,"_210":25,"_211":25,"_212":59,"_213":-5,"_214":-7,"_215":-7,"_216":63,"_217":25,"_218":25,"_219":-5,"_220":25,"_221":25,"_222":25,"_223":-5},"ENV",{"_175":176,"_177":178,"_179":90,"_180":181,"_182":183,"_184":185,"_186":187,"_188":189,"_190":191,"_192":193,"_194":195,"_196":197,"_198":199,"_200":201,"_202":203},"REACT_APP_SENTRY_DSN","https://586020d86f05489db63a554690acf1e9@o1398359.ingest.sentry.io/6724499","RENDER_GIT_COMMIT","e87eb04e707cf64e7e532c8e8ec395f209e17f15","RENDER_GIT_BRANCH","POSTHOG_API_TOKEN","phc_nmoyuAkStEZuUp69rYlg1DZgrIt19Gx0Y4Hwf8tGgJP","POSTHOG_API_HOST","https://wart.val.town","WEB_API_TEMPLATE","https://{val}.web.val.run","APP_URL","https://www.val.town","MODULE_URL","https://esm.town","VANITY_WEB_API_TEMPLATE","https://{label}.val.run/","DENOLS_URL","https://lsp.val.town","NODE_ENV","production","CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY","0x4AAAAAACtaIZJH7s9rBMZ6","GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID","875989696899-jtsqkhlbdv5jrlsk8631p7ipjg3c6o62.apps.googleusercontent.com","STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY","pk_live_51N2zvWEpZTTLipIkVEwXrUG9AT0yeOOEYxszarZT1jpsZV58Ly6wlg3SltZpHN26CUalOBmUSY7adQRQiSkCZz2500qSXNkf8Y","API_URL","https://api.val.town",[],"preferencesKeybindings","default","preferencesTheme","light","preferencesFixers","preferencesCopilot","preferencesSelectionAi","preferencesCloseBrackets","preferencesChatPanelState","preferencesDprint","preferencesDenofmt","notificationCount","flagDenols","isBusinessOrgMember","businessOrgHandle","isBusinessOrgAdmin","isHigherTownieTier","navCollapsed","currentOrgId"]

Diff · v16