[{"_1":2,"_3":-5,"_4":-5},"loaderData",{"_5":6,"_7":8,"_9":10},"actionData","errors","root",{"_214":215,"_216":217},"routes/_app.x.$handle.$name",{"_98":97,"_32":45,"_107":84,"_27":108,"_13":14,"_109":-5,"_11":110,"_111":112,"_113":114,"_115":116,"_117":118,"_20":-5,"_119":120,"_121":122,"_123":25,"_124":125,"_126":127,"_128":-5,"_129":-5,"_130":131},"routes/_app.x.$handle.$name.branch.$branch.version.$version.diff",{"_11":12,"_13":14,"_15":16,"_17":-5,"_18":-5},"project",{"_43":44,"_32":45,"_38":46,"_47":-5,"_48":25,"_49":50,"_51":50,"_52":-5,"_53":-5,"_18":54,"_55":-5,"_56":25,"_57":-5,"_58":-5,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":-5,"_64":-5,"_65":-5,"_66":-5,"_67":68,"_69":68,"_70":71,"_72":71,"_73":71,"_74":68,"_75":68,"_76":77,"_78":79,"_80":81,"_82":25},"version",18,"changes",[19],"aiChatInfo","userId",{"_20":21,"_22":23,"_24":25,"_26":25,"_27":28,"_29":28},"file",{"_30":31,"_32":28,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_38":39,"_40":14,"_41":42,"_24":25},"previous",{"_30":31,"_32":28,"_33":34,"_35":36},"deleted",false,"deletedHere","path","http.ts","latestPath","fileId","019e0434-9c35-77e8-8c2b-03cdfe3f2c7b","name","fileType","http","content","import { Hono } from \"npm:hono@3\";\nimport { cors } from \"npm:hono@3/cors\";\nimport * as jose from \"npm:jose@5\";\nimport { URLS, DEMO_USER } from \"./shared/config.ts\";\nimport { getOrCreateKeypair } from \"./shared/keys.ts\";\nimport { indexPage, xaaAuthorizeStub } from \"./shared/html.ts\";\nimport { deriveAs2Secret, debugCredsAs2 } from \"./shared/register.ts\";\n\nconst JWT_BEARER_GRANT = \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer\";\nconst ID_JAG_TYP = \"oauth-id-jag+jwt\";\n\n// Advertised in AS metadata (and mirrored in RS2's PRM). Fake-gmail themed —\n// breadth here is for RBAC×EMA scope-narrowing tests, not real enforcement.\nconst SCOPES_SUPPORTED = [\n \"gmail.read\",\n \"gmail.send\",\n \"gmail.modify\",\n \"gmail.compose\",\n \"gmail.labels\",\n \"gmail.metadata\",\n \"gmail.settings.basic\",\n \"gmail.settings.sharing\",\n \"contacts.read\",\n \"offline_access\",\n];\n\n// Static test credentials — demo val, fake data only. Accepted at /token\n// independent of the (iss, client_id, resource) HMAC tuple, so iterating\n// across issuers/tenants doesn't require re-deriving the secret each time.\nconst STATIC_TEST_CLIENT = { client_id: \"claude-ema-okta-test\", client_secret: \"as2_static_b4e7f20c9a51d836\" };\n\n// Claude-as-IdP: claude.ai mints its own JAGs (no upstream IdP). There's no\n// OIDC discovery at claude.ai yet, so we take the public key inline via env.\n// Set CLAUDE_AI_JWK to the JSON public JWK (the one matching\n// TOOLBOX_XAA_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY, with the same `kid`).\nconst CLAUDE_AI_ISS = \"https://claude.ai\";\nconst CLAUDE_AI_JWK = Deno.env.get(\"CLAUDE_AI_JWK\");\nif (CLAUDE_AI_JWK) {\n // DEBUG: surface what jose will actually see for the claude.ai key.\n // Env var must be a SINGLE JWK (we wrap it in {keys:[...]} at jwksFor).\n try {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(CLAUDE_AI_JWK);\n const k = Array.isArray(parsed.keys) ? parsed.keys[0] : parsed;\n console.log(\"[as2] CLAUDE_AI_JWK parsed:\", {\n kty: k?.kty, crv: k?.crv, alg: k?.alg, kid: k?.kid,\n envVarShape: Array.isArray(parsed.keys) ? \"jwks\" : \"single-jwk\",\n });\n } catch (e) {\n console.error(\"[as2] CLAUDE_AI_JWK is not valid JSON:\", e);\n }\n}\n\nconst kp = await getOrCreateKeypair(\"xaa_as2_signing_key_v1\");\n\n// JWKS resolver per issuer. For claude.ai we use the inline JWK; for\n// everything else we discover via OIDC (demo IdP, Okta, etc).\ntype KeyResolver = ReturnType | ReturnType;\nconst jwksCache = new Map();\nasync function jwksFor(issuer: string): Promise {\n let jwks = jwksCache.get(issuer);\n if (jwks) return jwks;\n if (issuer === CLAUDE_AI_ISS) {\n // Merge the inline env-var key (dev keypair) with the published toolbox\n // JWKS so JAGs from either signer verify.\n const keys: jose.JWK[] = [];\n if (CLAUDE_AI_JWK) {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(CLAUDE_AI_JWK);\n keys.push(...(Array.isArray(parsed.keys) ? parsed.keys : [parsed]));\n }\n for (const url of [\n \"https://claude.ai/v1/mcp/jwks\",\n \"https://claude-ai.staging.ant.dev/v1/mcp/jwks\",\n ]) {\n try {\n const remote = await fetch(url).then((r) => r.json());\n if (Array.isArray(remote.keys)) keys.push(...remote.keys);\n } catch (e) {\n console.error(`[as2] failed to fetch ${url}:`, e);\n }\n }\n console.log(\"[as2] claude.ai key set:\", keys.map((k) => ({ kid: k.kid, kty: k.kty, alg: k.alg })));\n jwks = jose.createLocalJWKSet({ keys });\n } else {\n const res = await fetch(`${issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`);\n if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`OIDC discovery failed for ${issuer}: HTTP ${res.status}`);\n const { jwks_uri } = await res.json();\n if (!jwks_uri) throw new Error(`${issuer} OIDC config missing jwks_uri`);\n jwks = jose.createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwks_uri));\n }\n jwksCache.set(issuer, jwks);\n return jwks;\n}\n\nconst app = new Hono();\napp.use(\"*\", cors({\n origin: \"*\",\n allowMethods: [\"GET\", \"POST\", \"OPTIONS\"],\n allowHeaders: [\"Content-Type\", \"Authorization\", \"mcp-protocol-version\"],\n}));\n\n// ─── Debug: request-URL tracer ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Ring-buffers the exact request URL (incl. query string) for discovery/auth\n// hits, so we can tell whether a client munges URLs at fetch time or only in\n// its display layer. No request bodies and no Authorization headers — only\n// method, URL, and User-Agent.\nconst REQLOG_BLOB_KEY = \"debug_request_log\";\nconst REQLOG_MAX = 50;\n\napp.use(\"*\", async (c, next) => {\n const path = new URL(c.req.url).pathname;\n // includes(): also catches path-prefix constructions like //.well-known/...\n if (path.includes(\"/.well-known/\") || path === \"/token\" || path === \"/authorize\") {\n try {\n const { blob } = await import(\"https://esm.town/v/std/blob\");\n const log = ((await blob.getJSON(REQLOG_BLOB_KEY)) as unknown[] | undefined) ?? [];\n log.push({\n ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n method: c.req.method,\n url: c.req.url,\n user_agent: c.req.header(\"User-Agent\") ?? null,\n });\n await blob.setJSON(REQLOG_BLOB_KEY, log.slice(-REQLOG_MAX));\n } catch (e) {\n console.error(\"[as2] reqlog failed:\", e); // never block the real request\n }\n }\n await next();\n});\n\napp.get(\"/debug/requests\", async (c) => {\n const { blob } = await import(\"https://esm.town/v/std/blob\");\n return c.json(((await blob.getJSON(REQLOG_BLOB_KEY)) as unknown[] | undefined) ?? []);\n});\n\n// ─── Metadata + JWKS ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\", (c) => {\n // Tenant-tagged discovery probe: when the AS URL a client discovered carried\n // ?tenant=, echo it (extra metadata fields are spec-legal) and tag the\n // authorize/token endpoints so munging on any later hop is observable too.\n // Without the param the response is byte-identical to the untagged form.\n const tenant = c.req.query(\"tenant\");\n const tq = tenant ? `?tenant=${encodeURIComponent(tenant)}` : \"\";\n return c.json({\n issuer: URLS.as2,\n token_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/token${tq}`,\n authorization_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/authorize${tq}`,\n registration_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/register`,\n response_types_supported: [\"code\"],\n grant_types_supported: [JWT_BEARER_GRANT, \"authorization_code\"],\n scopes_supported: SCOPES_SUPPORTED,\n code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"],\n // \"none\" → CIMD clients are public; PKCE is their proof of possession\n token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [\"client_secret_basic\", \"client_secret_post\", \"none\"],\n client_id_metadata_document_supported: true,\n ...(tenant ? { tenant } : {}),\n });\n});\n\n// Path-scoped (Atlassian-style tenanted) AS metadata. Served at every\n// well-known construction a client might derive from an AS URL of the form\n// / — RFC 8414 path-suffix, path-prefix, and the\n// openid-configuration analogues — so the tracer shows which one is fetched.\n// issuer is path-scoped (realistic; exercises client aud derivation), but the\n// authorize/token endpoints stay the working base URLs.\nconst pathTenantMetadata = (tenant: string) => ({\n issuer: `${URLS.as2}/${tenant}`,\n token_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/token`,\n authorization_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/authorize`,\n registration_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/register`,\n response_types_supported: [\"code\"],\n grant_types_supported: [JWT_BEARER_GRANT, \"authorization_code\"],\n scopes_supported: SCOPES_SUPPORTED,\n code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"],\n token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [\"client_secret_basic\", \"client_secret_post\", \"none\"],\n client_id_metadata_document_supported: true,\n tenant,\n});\nfor (const route of [\n \"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/:tenant\",\n \"/:tenant/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\",\n \"/.well-known/openid-configuration/:tenant\",\n \"/:tenant/.well-known/openid-configuration\",\n]) {\n app.get(route, (c) => c.json(pathTenantMetadata(c.req.param(\"tenant\"))));\n}\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/jwks.json\", (c) => c.json({ keys: [kp.publicJwk] }));\n\n// ─── CIMD — draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document ───────────────────\n// A client_id that is an https URL is dereferenced; the RFC 7591 metadata\n// document it serves IS the registration — no /register round-trip. Cached\n// briefly so one authorize→token exchange doesn't refetch it.\n\ninterface ClientMetadata {\n client_id?: string;\n client_name?: string;\n redirect_uris?: string[];\n token_endpoint_auth_method?: string;\n [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nconst cimdCache = new Map();\nconst CIMD_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;\n\nfunction isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n return hostname === \"localhost\" || hostname === \"127.0.0.1\" || hostname === \"[::1]\";\n}\n\nfunction isCimdClientId(clientId: string): boolean {\n try {\n const u = new URL(clientId);\n if (u.hash || u.username) return false;\n if (u.protocol === \"https:\") return !!u.hostname;\n // Local-dev clients publish their metadata on a loopback origin (e.g.\n // http://localhost:4000/...). Accept the URL as an identifier; fetchCimd\n // knows it can't be dereferenced from here.\n return u.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(u.hostname);\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n// SSRF guard for CIMD dereferences: https only, no loopback/private/link-local\n// hosts, no redirects, 5s cap. Proportionate for a sandboxed demo val — no\n// DNS-resolution pinning.\nfunction assertFetchableCimdUrl(u: URL): void {\n if (u.protocol !== \"https:\") throw new Error(\"client_id must be an https URL to dereference\");\n const host = u.hostname.replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, \"\").toLowerCase();\n if (host === \"localhost\") throw new Error(\"refusing to dereference a loopback host\");\n const privateHost = /^(127\\.|10\\.|172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.|192\\.168\\.|169\\.254\\.|0\\.|::1$|f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:|fe80:)/i;\n if (privateHost.test(host)) throw new Error(\"refusing to dereference a private/loopback/link-local address\");\n}\n\nasync function fetchCimd(clientId: string): Promise {\n const cached = cimdCache.get(clientId);\n if (cached && Date.now() - cached.fetchedAt < CIMD_TTL_MS) return cached.doc;\n const u = new URL(clientId);\n if (u.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(u.hostname)) {\n // Only reachable on the developer's machine — accept the identifier\n // without dereferencing. /authorize limits such clients to loopback redirects.\n const doc: ClientMetadata = { client_id: clientId, client_name: `local-dev client (${u.host}, not dereferenced)` };\n cimdCache.set(clientId, { doc, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n console.log(\"[as2] CIMD loopback client accepted without fetch:\", clientId);\n return doc;\n }\n assertFetchableCimdUrl(u);\n const res = await fetch(clientId, {\n headers: { Accept: \"application/json\" },\n redirect: \"error\",\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n });\n if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`HTTP ${res.status} fetching client metadata document`);\n const doc = await res.json() as ClientMetadata;\n // Spec: a client_id member in the document must equal the URL it was fetched from.\n if (doc.client_id && doc.client_id !== clientId) {\n throw new Error(`document client_id (${doc.client_id}) != client_id URL`);\n }\n if (!Array.isArray(doc.redirect_uris) || doc.redirect_uris.length === 0) {\n throw new Error(\"client metadata document has no redirect_uris\");\n }\n cimdCache.set(clientId, { doc, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n console.log(\"[as2] CIMD fetched:\", { client_id: clientId, client_name: doc.client_name, redirect_uris: doc.redirect_uris });\n return doc;\n}\n\nfunction b64url(buf: ArrayBuffer): string {\n return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(buf))).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\n// A dereferenceable sample client document, so the CIMD flow can be exercised\n// with curl — real clients bring their own metadata URL.\nconst DEMO_CLIENT_PATH = \"/demo-client-metadata.json\";\napp.get(DEMO_CLIENT_PATH, (c) =>\n c.json({\n client_id: `${URLS.as2}${DEMO_CLIENT_PATH}`,\n client_name: \"XAA demo CIMD client\",\n redirect_uris: [\"http://localhost:8976/callback\", \"https://example.com/callback\"],\n token_endpoint_auth_method: \"none\",\n grant_types: [\"authorization_code\"],\n response_types: [\"code\"],\n }));\n\n// ─── /authorize — authorization_code + PKCE ─────────────────────────────────\n// GET renders a consent page (no user store — a fixed demo identity approves);\n// POST mints the code. The code is a short-lived self-contained JWT signed\n// with the AS key, so nothing has to be persisted between /authorize and\n// /token. CIMD client_ids (https URL) validate redirect_uri against their\n// metadata document; opaque client_ids (stateless DCR — nothing stored to\n// match against) just need an https or loopback redirect_uri.\n\nconst PERSONAL_USER = { sub: \"demo-user\", email: \"jlu@anthropic.com\" };\n\nasync function checkAuthorizeRequest(\n q: Record,\n): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string; description: string }> {\n if (q.response_type && q.response_type !== \"code\") {\n return { ok: false, error: \"unsupported_response_type\", description: String(q.response_type) };\n }\n if (q.code_challenge_method && q.code_challenge_method !== \"S256\") {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_request\", description: \"only S256 code_challenge_method is supported\" };\n }\n if (isCimdClientId(q.client_id!)) {\n let meta: ClientMetadata;\n try {\n meta = await fetchCimd(q.client_id!);\n } catch (e) {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_client\", description: `client metadata document fetch failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` };\n }\n const registeredRedirects = meta.redirect_uris ?? [];\n let redirectOk = registeredRedirects.includes(q.redirect_uri!);\n if (!redirectOk && registeredRedirects.length === 0) {\n // Loopback client whose metadata we couldn't dereference: allow loopback redirects only.\n try {\n const r = new URL(q.redirect_uri!);\n redirectOk = r.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(r.hostname);\n } catch { /* leave false */ }\n }\n if (!redirectOk) {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_request\", description: \"redirect_uri is not listed in the client metadata document\" };\n }\n } else {\n let redirectOk = false;\n try {\n const r = new URL(q.redirect_uri!);\n redirectOk = r.protocol === \"https:\" || (r.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(r.hostname));\n } catch { /* leave false */ }\n if (!redirectOk) {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_request\", description: \"redirect_uri must be https (or http on loopback)\" };\n }\n }\n return { ok: true };\n}\n\nconst AUTHZ_PARAMS = [\"response_type\", \"client_id\", \"redirect_uri\", \"resource\", \"scope\", \"state\", \"code_challenge\", \"code_challenge_method\"];\nconst escapeHtml = (s: string) =>\n s.replace(/&/g, \"&\").replace(//g, \">\").replace(/\"/g, \""\").replace(/'/g, \"'\");\n\napp.get(\"/authorize\", async (c) => {\n const q = c.req.query();\n // Bare browser visit keeps the explanatory stub.\n if (!q.client_id || !q.redirect_uri) return c.html(xaaAuthorizeStub(URLS.as2, q), 400);\n const check = await checkAuthorizeRequest(q);\n if (!check.ok) return c.json({ error: check.error, error_description: check.description }, 400);\n\n const hidden = AUTHZ_PARAMS.filter((k) => q[k])\n .map((k) => ``)\n .join(\"\\n\");\n console.log(\"[as2] /authorize consent page:\", { client_id: q.client_id, redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri, scope: q.scope });\n return c.html(`Authorize — AS2\n\n\n

Authorize access

Signed in as ${escapeHtml(PERSONAL_USER.email)} (sub: ${escapeHtml(PERSONAL_USER.sub)})

Client ${escapeHtml(q.client_id)} is requesting:

${escapeHtml(q.scope || \"(no scopes requested)\")}

\n\n

`);\n});\n\napp.post(\"/authorize\", async (c) => {\n const form = await c.req.parseBody();\n const q: Record = {};\n for (const k of AUTHZ_PARAMS) if (typeof form[k] === \"string\") q[k] = form[k] as string;\n if (!q.client_id || !q.redirect_uri) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"client_id and redirect_uri are required\" }, 400);\n }\n const check = await checkAuthorizeRequest(q);\n if (!check.ok) return c.json({ error: check.error, error_description: check.description }, 400);\n\n const code = await new jose.SignJWT({\n use: \"authorization_code\",\n client_id: q.client_id,\n redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri,\n resource: q.resource ?? RESOURCES[0],\n ...(q.scope ? { scope: q.scope } : {}),\n ...(q.code_challenge ? { code_challenge: q.code_challenge } : {}),\n })\n .setProtectedHeader({ alg: \"ES256\", kid: kp.kid })\n .setIssuer(URLS.as2)\n .setAudience(`${URLS.as2}/token`)\n .setSubject(PERSONAL_USER.sub)\n .setIssuedAt()\n .setExpirationTime(\"5m\")\n .sign(kp.privateKey);\n\n const target = new URL(q.redirect_uri);\n target.searchParams.set(\"code\", code);\n if (q.state) target.searchParams.set(\"state\", q.state);\n console.log(\"[as2] /authorize approved:\", { client_id: q.client_id, redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri, resource: q.resource, scope: q.scope });\n return c.redirect(target.toString(), 302);\n});\n\n// ─── /register — bring your own client_id ───────────────────────────────────\n// You bring the client_id your IdP will stamp in the JAG (for Okta: the\n// resource app's Okta-issued id; for the demo IdP: your idp_id_...). We give\n// you back a secret bound to (idp_issuer, that_client_id, resource). The\n// secret IS the trust decision — at /token we re-derive it from the JAG's\n// iss + client_id + resource and it has to match.\n\nconst RESOURCES = [`${URLS.rs2}/mcp`];\n\napp.get(\"/register\", (c) =>\n c.html(`Register — AS2\n\n

Register at AS2

You bring the client_id — whatever your IdP stamps in the JAG's client_id claim. For Okta that's the resource app's Okta client_id (e.g. 0oa10m6h81mEkTVXn698). For the demo IdP it's your idp_id_....

We bind a secret to (idp_issuer, client_id, resource). At /token we re-derive the secret from the JAG claims — that's the trust gate. No separate issuer allowlist.

\n`));\n\napp.post(\"/register\", async (c) => {\n const contentType = c.req.header(\"Content-Type\") ?? \"\";\n\n // RFC 7591 DCR (JSON) — toolbox hits this via get_or_register_client_credentials.\n // We don't know the issuer or resource from a standard DCR body, so assume\n // claude.ai + the single RS we front. The derived secret is stateless and\n // will re-derive identically at /token from (JAG.iss, client_id, body.resource).\n if (contentType.includes(\"application/json\")) {\n const body = await c.req.json(); // consume + ignore body (redirect_uris, grant_types, etc.)\n const clientId = `claude_${crypto.randomUUID().slice(0, 12)}`;\n const resource = RESOURCES[0];\n const clientSecret = await deriveAs2Secret(CLAUDE_AI_ISS, clientId, resource);\n return c.json({\n client_id: clientId,\n client_secret: clientSecret,\n client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n grant_types: [JWT_BEARER_GRANT],\n redirect_uris: body.redirect_uris ?? [],\n token_endpoint_auth_method: \"client_secret_post\",\n // echoed so the caller can sanity-check the binding if they care\n _issuer_binding: CLAUDE_AI_ISS,\n _resource_binding: resource,\n }, 201);\n }\n\n // Form POST — manual registration (Okta / demo-IdP path)\n const body = await c.req.parseBody();\n const idpIssuer = (body.idp_issuer as string)?.replace(/\\/$/, \"\");\n const jagClientId = body.jag_client_id as string;\n const resource = body.resource as string;\n if (!idpIssuer || !jagClientId || !resource) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"idp_issuer, jag_client_id, resource required\" }, 400);\n }\n const client_secret = await deriveAs2Secret(idpIssuer, jagClientId, resource);\n return c.json({ client_id: jagClientId, client_secret, idp_issuer: idpIssuer, resource });\n});\n\n// ─── /token — jwt-bearer ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// The secret IS the trust decision. Re-derive from JAG.iss + authenticating\n// client_id + resource; if the presented secret matches, you registered for\n// exactly this tuple. Then verify the JAG sig against that issuer's JWKS.\n\napp.post(\"/token\", async (c) => {\n const body = await c.req.parseBody();\n\n // ── authorization_code + PKCE — the CIMD path. The code is the JWT we\n // signed at /authorize, so verification is local; nothing to look up.\n if (body.grant_type === \"authorization_code\") {\n // Client auth on this grant is client_id binding only (the code is bound\n // to client_id; PKCE is the proof) — secrets aren't verified, so the\n // STATIC_TEST_CLIENT pair works here too.\n let cimdClientId = body.client_id as string | undefined;\n const basicAuthz = c.req.header(\"Authorization\");\n if (!cimdClientId && basicAuthz?.startsWith(\"Basic \")) {\n cimdClientId = decodeURIComponent(atob(basicAuthz.slice(6)).split(\":\")[0]);\n }\n const code = body.code as string | undefined;\n if (!cimdClientId || !code) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"client_id and code are required\" }, 400);\n }\n let codeClaims: jose.JWTPayload;\n try {\n ({ payload: codeClaims } = await jose.jwtVerify(code, kp.publicKey, {\n issuer: URLS.as2,\n audience: `${URLS.as2}/token`,\n }));\n } catch (e) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: `invalid or expired code: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` }, 400);\n }\n if (codeClaims.client_id !== cimdClientId) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"code was issued to a different client_id\" }, 400);\n }\n if (body.redirect_uri && body.redirect_uri !== codeClaims.redirect_uri) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"redirect_uri mismatch\" }, 400);\n }\n if (codeClaims.code_challenge) {\n const verifier = body.code_verifier as string | undefined;\n if (!verifier) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"code_verifier is required (PKCE)\" }, 400);\n }\n const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", new TextEncoder().encode(verifier));\n if (b64url(digest) !== codeClaims.code_challenge) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"PKCE verification failed\" }, 400);\n }\n }\n const aud = (codeClaims.resource as string | undefined) ?? (body.resource as string | undefined) ?? RESOURCES[0];\n const scope = codeClaims.scope as string | undefined;\n const accessToken = await new jose.SignJWT({ client_id: cimdClientId, ...(scope ? { scope } : {}) })\n .setProtectedHeader({ alg: \"ES256\", kid: kp.kid })\n .setIssuer(URLS.as2)\n .setAudience(aud)\n .setSubject(codeClaims.sub!)\n .setIssuedAt()\n .setExpirationTime(\"1h\")\n .sign(kp.privateKey);\n console.log(\"[as2] /token authorization_code (CIMD):\", { client_id: cimdClientId, aud, scope });\n return c.json({ access_token: accessToken, token_type: \"Bearer\", expires_in: 3600, ...(scope ? { scope } : {}) });\n }\n\n if (body.grant_type !== JWT_BEARER_GRANT) {\n return c.json({ error: \"unsupported_grant_type\", error_description: String(body.grant_type) }, 400);\n }\n\n let clientId: string | undefined, clientSecret: string | undefined;\n const authz = c.req.header(\"Authorization\");\n if (authz?.startsWith(\"Basic \")) {\n const decoded = atob(authz.slice(6));\n const sep = decoded.indexOf(\":\");\n clientId = decodeURIComponent(decoded.slice(0, sep));\n clientSecret = decodeURIComponent(decoded.slice(sep + 1));\n } else {\n clientId = body.client_id as string;\n clientSecret = body.client_secret as string;\n }\n // CIMD clients (client_id = https URL) are public — no secret to present.\n const isCimdClient = !!clientId && !clientSecret && isCimdClientId(clientId);\n if (!clientId || (!clientSecret && !isCimdClient)) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_client\", error_description: \"missing client credentials\" }, 401);\n }\n console.log(\"[as2] /token client auth:\", {\n via: isCimdClient ? \"cimd\" : authz?.startsWith(\"Basic \") ? \"basic\" : \"body\",\n client_id: clientId,\n secret_prefix: clientSecret ? clientSecret.slice(0, 12) + \"…\" : \"(none)\",\n body_resource: body.resource,\n body_scope: body.scope,\n });\n\n const assertion = body.assertion as string;\n if (!assertion) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"missing assertion\" }, 400);\n }\n\n // Spec draft says `typ: oauth-id-jag+jwt`. Okta sets it. PyJWT (toolbox)\n // defaults to `typ: JWT` — neither wrong per RFC 7523. Accept either or absent.\n const header = jose.decodeProtectedHeader(assertion);\n if (header.typ && header.typ !== ID_JAG_TYP && header.typ.toLowerCase() !== \"jwt\") {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: `typ must be ${ID_JAG_TYP} or JWT, got ${header.typ}` }, 400);\n }\n\n // Unsafe decode — sig verified below, AFTER the secret check proves we\n // trust this issuer for this client.\n const unverified = jose.decodeJwt(assertion);\n console.log(\"[as2] /token ID-JAG claims:\", { header: { typ: header.typ, alg: header.alg, kid: header.kid }, payload: unverified });\n const iss = (unverified.iss ?? \"\").replace(/\\/$/, \"\");\n if (!iss) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"ID-JAG missing iss\" }, 400);\n }\n // Spec §3.1: `resource` in the JAG is OPTIONAL. Okta may omit it.\n // Fall back to the RFC 8707 request param — CC always sends it.\n const jagResource = (unverified.resource as string | undefined) ?? (body.resource as string | undefined);\n if (!jagResource) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"no resource: ID-JAG omits the claim and request lacks the parameter\" }, 400);\n }\n\n // Spec binding — JAG says it's for client_id X, you must be authing as X.\n // Cheap check; do it before crypto.\n if (unverified.client_id !== clientId) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_grant\",\n error_description: `ID-JAG client_id (${unverified.client_id}) != authenticating client (${clientId})`,\n }, 400);\n }\n\n // Trust gate. CIMD clients have no registration step — the client_id binding\n // check above plus the JAG signature check below carry the trust, and the\n // metadata document has to dereference. Registered clients keep the\n // re-derived-secret gate: a match means you registered for exactly this tuple.\n if (clientId === STATIC_TEST_CLIENT.client_id && clientSecret === STATIC_TEST_CLIENT.client_secret) {\n // static test creds — tuple-independent; the JAG client_id binding above still applies\n } else if (isCimdClient) {\n try {\n await fetchCimd(clientId);\n } catch (e) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_client\", error_description: `client metadata document fetch failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` }, 401);\n }\n } else if (clientSecret !== await deriveAs2Secret(iss, clientId, jagResource)) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_client\",\n error_description: `secret not bound to (iss=${iss}, client_id, resource). Register at ${URLS.as2}/register`,\n }, 401);\n }\n\n // Now we trust `iss` enough to fetch its keys.\n let claims: jose.JWTPayload;\n try {\n const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(assertion, await jwksFor(iss), {\n issuer: iss,\n // RFC 7523 §3 says token-endpoint URL MAY be the aud. Okta uses the\n // issuer URL; toolbox uses the token endpoint; tenanted discovery may\n // derive a path-scoped variant (/). Tenants are\n // open-ended, so check manually instead of an exact-match list.\n clockTolerance: 30,\n });\n const audList = Array.isArray(payload.aud) ? payload.aud : payload.aud ? [payload.aud] : [];\n if (!audList.some((a) => a === URLS.as2 || a.startsWith(`${URLS.as2}/`))) {\n throw new Error(`unexpected aud ${JSON.stringify(payload.aud)}`);\n }\n claims = payload;\n } catch (e) {\n // DEBUG: jose errors are terse — log header vs configured-key so kid/alg\n // mismatches and double-wrapped JWKS are obvious in the val logs.\n let cfg: unknown;\n try { cfg = CLAUDE_AI_JWK ? JSON.parse(CLAUDE_AI_JWK) : undefined; } catch { cfg = \"\"; }\n console.error(\"[as2] ID-JAG verify failed\", {\n iss,\n tokenHeader: header, // alg + kid the token was signed with\n configuredClaudeJwk: iss === CLAUDE_AI_ISS ? cfg : \"\",\n err: { name: (e as Error)?.name, code: (e as { code?: string })?.code, message: (e as Error)?.message },\n });\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: `ID-JAG verify failed (iss=${iss}): ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` }, 400);\n }\n\n // RBAC×EMA: surface every scope source so upstream changes are observable.\n // Access token currently carries no scope claim — grant-through is TODO.\n console.log(\"[as2] /token jwt-bearer scopes:\", {\n request_param: body.scope, // RFC 6749 scope param on the token POST\n jag_scope: claims.scope, // space-delimited string form\n jag_scp: claims.scp, // array form (Okta)\n });\n\n const accessToken = await new jose.SignJWT({})\n .setProtectedHeader({ alg: \"ES256\", kid: kp.kid })\n .setIssuer(URLS.as2)\n .setAudience(jagResource)\n .setSubject(claims.sub!)\n .setIssuedAt()\n .setExpirationTime(\"1h\")\n .sign(kp.privateKey);\n\n return c.json({ access_token: accessToken, token_type: \"Bearer\", expires_in: 3600 });\n});\n\n// ─── Debug — demo-IdP path only (can't mint Okta id_tokens) ─────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/debug/context\", async (c) => {\n const idToken = await fetch(`${URLS.idp}/debug/mint-id-token`).then((r) => r.text());\n const { idp, as } = await debugCredsAs2();\n return c.json({\n client_id: as.client_id,\n client_secret: as.client_secret,\n idp_client_id: idp.client_id,\n idp_client_secret: idp.client_secret,\n idp_id_token: idToken,\n idp_token_endpoint: `${URLS.idp}/token`,\n });\n});\n\n// ─── Index ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/\", (c) =>\n c.html(indexPage({\n role: \"AS\",\n name: \"xaa-mcp-as2\",\n endpoints: [\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/.well-known/jwks.json\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/demo-client-metadata.json\", note: \"sample CIMD document — use its URL as client_id to try the flow\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/authorize\", note: \"authorization_code + PKCE; CIMD (https URL) or DCR client_ids; consent page approves as the demo user\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/register\", note: \"bring your own client_id; we bind a secret to (iss, id, resource). CIMD clients skip this\" },\n { method: \"POST\", path: \"/token\", note: \"authorization_code + jwt-bearer; CIMD or secret-as-trust\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/debug/context\", note: \"conformance ctx (demo-IdP path)\" },\n ],\n })));\n\napp.onError((err) => { throw err; });\n\nexport default app.fetch;\nif (import.meta.main) Deno.serve({ port: 3005 }, app.fetch);\n","import { Hono } from \"npm:hono@3\";\nimport { cors } from \"npm:hono@3/cors\";\nimport * as jose from \"npm:jose@5\";\nimport { URLS, DEMO_USER } from \"./shared/config.ts\";\nimport { getOrCreateKeypair } from \"./shared/keys.ts\";\nimport { indexPage, xaaAuthorizeStub } from \"./shared/html.ts\";\nimport { deriveAs2Secret, debugCredsAs2 } from \"./shared/register.ts\";\n\nconst JWT_BEARER_GRANT = \"urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer\";\nconst ID_JAG_TYP = \"oauth-id-jag+jwt\";\n\n// Advertised in AS metadata (and mirrored in RS2's PRM). Fake-gmail themed —\n// breadth here is for RBAC×EMA scope-narrowing tests, not real enforcement.\nconst SCOPES_SUPPORTED = [\n \"gmail.read\",\n \"gmail.send\",\n \"gmail.modify\",\n \"gmail.compose\",\n \"gmail.labels\",\n \"gmail.metadata\",\n \"gmail.settings.basic\",\n \"gmail.settings.sharing\",\n \"contacts.read\",\n \"offline_access\",\n];\n\n// Static test credentials — demo val, fake data only. Accepted at /token\n// independent of the (iss, client_id, resource) HMAC tuple, so iterating\n// across issuers/tenants doesn't require re-deriving the secret each time.\nconst STATIC_TEST_CLIENT = { client_id: \"claude-ema-okta-test\", client_secret: \"as2_static_b4e7f20c9a51d836\" };\n\n// Claude-as-IdP: claude.ai mints its own JAGs (no upstream IdP). There's no\n// OIDC discovery at claude.ai yet, so we take the public key inline via env.\n// Set CLAUDE_AI_JWK to the JSON public JWK (the one matching\n// TOOLBOX_XAA_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY, with the same `kid`).\nconst CLAUDE_AI_ISS = \"https://claude.ai\";\nconst CLAUDE_AI_JWK = Deno.env.get(\"CLAUDE_AI_JWK\");\nif (CLAUDE_AI_JWK) {\n // DEBUG: surface what jose will actually see for the claude.ai key.\n // Env var must be a SINGLE JWK (we wrap it in {keys:[...]} at jwksFor).\n try {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(CLAUDE_AI_JWK);\n const k = Array.isArray(parsed.keys) ? parsed.keys[0] : parsed;\n console.log(\"[as2] CLAUDE_AI_JWK parsed:\", {\n kty: k?.kty, crv: k?.crv, alg: k?.alg, kid: k?.kid,\n envVarShape: Array.isArray(parsed.keys) ? \"jwks\" : \"single-jwk\",\n });\n } catch (e) {\n console.error(\"[as2] CLAUDE_AI_JWK is not valid JSON:\", e);\n }\n}\n\nconst kp = await getOrCreateKeypair(\"xaa_as2_signing_key_v1\");\n\n// JWKS resolver per issuer. For claude.ai we use the inline JWK; for\n// everything else we discover via OIDC (demo IdP, Okta, etc).\ntype KeyResolver = ReturnType | ReturnType;\nconst jwksCache = new Map();\nasync function jwksFor(issuer: string): Promise {\n let jwks = jwksCache.get(issuer);\n if (jwks) return jwks;\n if (issuer === CLAUDE_AI_ISS) {\n // Merge the inline env-var key (dev keypair) with the published toolbox\n // JWKS so JAGs from either signer verify.\n const keys: jose.JWK[] = [];\n if (CLAUDE_AI_JWK) {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(CLAUDE_AI_JWK);\n keys.push(...(Array.isArray(parsed.keys) ? parsed.keys : [parsed]));\n }\n for (const url of [\n \"https://claude.ai/v1/mcp/jwks\",\n \"https://claude-ai.staging.ant.dev/v1/mcp/jwks\",\n ]) {\n try {\n const remote = await fetch(url).then((r) => r.json());\n if (Array.isArray(remote.keys)) keys.push(...remote.keys);\n } catch (e) {\n console.error(`[as2] failed to fetch ${url}:`, e);\n }\n }\n console.log(\"[as2] claude.ai key set:\", keys.map((k) => ({ kid: k.kid, kty: k.kty, alg: k.alg })));\n jwks = jose.createLocalJWKSet({ keys });\n } else {\n const res = await fetch(`${issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`);\n if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`OIDC discovery failed for ${issuer}: HTTP ${res.status}`);\n const { jwks_uri } = await res.json();\n if (!jwks_uri) throw new Error(`${issuer} OIDC config missing jwks_uri`);\n jwks = jose.createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(jwks_uri));\n }\n jwksCache.set(issuer, jwks);\n return jwks;\n}\n\nconst app = new Hono();\napp.use(\"*\", cors({\n origin: \"*\",\n allowMethods: [\"GET\", \"POST\", \"OPTIONS\"],\n allowHeaders: [\"Content-Type\", \"Authorization\", \"mcp-protocol-version\"],\n}));\n\n// ─── Debug: request-URL tracer ──────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Ring-buffers the exact request URL (incl. query string) for discovery/auth\n// hits, so we can tell whether a client munges URLs at fetch time or only in\n// its display layer. No request bodies and no Authorization headers — only\n// method, URL, and User-Agent.\nconst REQLOG_BLOB_KEY = \"debug_request_log\";\nconst REQLOG_MAX = 50;\n\napp.use(\"*\", async (c, next) => {\n const path = new URL(c.req.url).pathname;\n // includes(): also catches path-prefix constructions like //.well-known/...\n if (path.includes(\"/.well-known/\") || path === \"/token\" || path === \"/authorize\") {\n try {\n const { blob } = await import(\"https://esm.town/v/std/blob\");\n const log = ((await blob.getJSON(REQLOG_BLOB_KEY)) as unknown[] | undefined) ?? [];\n log.push({\n ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n method: c.req.method,\n url: c.req.url,\n user_agent: c.req.header(\"User-Agent\") ?? null,\n });\n await blob.setJSON(REQLOG_BLOB_KEY, log.slice(-REQLOG_MAX));\n } catch (e) {\n console.error(\"[as2] reqlog failed:\", e); // never block the real request\n }\n }\n await next();\n});\n\napp.get(\"/debug/requests\", async (c) => {\n const { blob } = await import(\"https://esm.town/v/std/blob\");\n return c.json(((await blob.getJSON(REQLOG_BLOB_KEY)) as unknown[] | undefined) ?? []);\n});\n\n// ─── Metadata + JWKS ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\", (c) => {\n // Tenant-tagged discovery probe: when the AS URL a client discovered carried\n // ?tenant=, echo it (extra metadata fields are spec-legal) and tag the\n // authorize/token endpoints so munging on any later hop is observable too.\n // Without the param the response is byte-identical to the untagged form.\n const tenant = c.req.query(\"tenant\");\n const tq = tenant ? `?tenant=${encodeURIComponent(tenant)}` : \"\";\n return c.json({\n issuer: URLS.as2,\n token_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/token${tq}`,\n authorization_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/authorize${tq}`,\n registration_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/register`,\n response_types_supported: [\"code\"],\n grant_types_supported: [JWT_BEARER_GRANT, \"authorization_code\"],\n scopes_supported: SCOPES_SUPPORTED,\n code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"],\n // \"none\" → CIMD clients are public; PKCE is their proof of possession\n token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [\"client_secret_basic\", \"client_secret_post\", \"none\"],\n client_id_metadata_document_supported: true,\n ...(tenant ? { tenant } : {}),\n });\n});\n\n// Path-scoped (Atlassian-style tenanted) AS metadata. Served at every\n// well-known construction a client might derive from an AS URL of the form\n// / — RFC 8414 path-suffix, path-prefix, and the\n// openid-configuration analogues — so the tracer shows which one is fetched.\n// issuer is path-scoped (realistic; exercises client aud derivation), but the\n// authorize/token endpoints stay the working base URLs.\nconst pathTenantMetadata = (tenant: string) => ({\n issuer: `${URLS.as2}/${tenant}`,\n token_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/token`,\n authorization_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/authorize`,\n registration_endpoint: `${URLS.as2}/register`,\n response_types_supported: [\"code\"],\n grant_types_supported: [JWT_BEARER_GRANT, \"authorization_code\"],\n scopes_supported: SCOPES_SUPPORTED,\n code_challenge_methods_supported: [\"S256\"],\n token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [\"client_secret_basic\", \"client_secret_post\", \"none\"],\n client_id_metadata_document_supported: true,\n tenant,\n});\nfor (const route of [\n \"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/:tenant\",\n \"/:tenant/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\",\n \"/.well-known/openid-configuration/:tenant\",\n \"/:tenant/.well-known/openid-configuration\",\n]) {\n app.get(route, (c) => c.json(pathTenantMetadata(c.req.param(\"tenant\"))));\n}\n\napp.get(\"/.well-known/jwks.json\", (c) => c.json({ keys: [kp.publicJwk] }));\n\n// ─── CIMD — draft-ietf-oauth-client-id-metadata-document ───────────────────\n// A client_id that is an https URL is dereferenced; the RFC 7591 metadata\n// document it serves IS the registration — no /register round-trip. Cached\n// briefly so one authorize→token exchange doesn't refetch it.\n\ninterface ClientMetadata {\n client_id?: string;\n client_name?: string;\n redirect_uris?: string[];\n token_endpoint_auth_method?: string;\n [k: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nconst cimdCache = new Map();\nconst CIMD_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;\n\nfunction isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n return hostname === \"localhost\" || hostname === \"127.0.0.1\" || hostname === \"[::1]\";\n}\n\nfunction isCimdClientId(clientId: string): boolean {\n try {\n const u = new URL(clientId);\n if (u.hash || u.username) return false;\n if (u.protocol === \"https:\") return !!u.hostname;\n // Local-dev clients publish their metadata on a loopback origin (e.g.\n // http://localhost:4000/...). Accept the URL as an identifier; fetchCimd\n // knows it can't be dereferenced from here.\n return u.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(u.hostname);\n } catch {\n return false;\n }\n}\n\n// SSRF guard for CIMD dereferences: https only, no loopback/private/link-local\n// hosts, no redirects, 5s cap. Proportionate for a sandboxed demo val — no\n// DNS-resolution pinning.\nfunction assertFetchableCimdUrl(u: URL): void {\n if (u.protocol !== \"https:\") throw new Error(\"client_id must be an https URL to dereference\");\n const host = u.hostname.replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, \"\").toLowerCase();\n if (host === \"localhost\") throw new Error(\"refusing to dereference a loopback host\");\n const privateHost = /^(127\\.|10\\.|172\\.(1[6-9]|2\\d|3[01])\\.|192\\.168\\.|169\\.254\\.|0\\.|::1$|f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:|fe80:)/i;\n if (privateHost.test(host)) throw new Error(\"refusing to dereference a private/loopback/link-local address\");\n}\n\nasync function fetchCimd(clientId: string): Promise {\n const cached = cimdCache.get(clientId);\n if (cached && Date.now() - cached.fetchedAt < CIMD_TTL_MS) return cached.doc;\n const u = new URL(clientId);\n if (u.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(u.hostname)) {\n // Only reachable on the developer's machine — accept the identifier\n // without dereferencing. /authorize limits such clients to loopback redirects.\n const doc: ClientMetadata = { client_id: clientId, client_name: `local-dev client (${u.host}, not dereferenced)` };\n cimdCache.set(clientId, { doc, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n console.log(\"[as2] CIMD loopback client accepted without fetch:\", clientId);\n return doc;\n }\n assertFetchableCimdUrl(u);\n const res = await fetch(clientId, {\n headers: { Accept: \"application/json\" },\n redirect: \"error\",\n signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n });\n if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`HTTP ${res.status} fetching client metadata document`);\n const doc = await res.json() as ClientMetadata;\n // Spec: a client_id member in the document must equal the URL it was fetched from.\n if (doc.client_id && doc.client_id !== clientId) {\n throw new Error(`document client_id (${doc.client_id}) != client_id URL`);\n }\n if (!Array.isArray(doc.redirect_uris) || doc.redirect_uris.length === 0) {\n throw new Error(\"client metadata document has no redirect_uris\");\n }\n cimdCache.set(clientId, { doc, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n console.log(\"[as2] CIMD fetched:\", { client_id: clientId, client_name: doc.client_name, redirect_uris: doc.redirect_uris });\n return doc;\n}\n\nfunction b64url(buf: ArrayBuffer): string {\n return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(buf))).replace(/\\+/g, \"-\").replace(/\\//g, \"_\").replace(/=+$/, \"\");\n}\n\n// A dereferenceable sample client document, so the CIMD flow can be exercised\n// with curl — real clients bring their own metadata URL.\nconst DEMO_CLIENT_PATH = \"/demo-client-metadata.json\";\napp.get(DEMO_CLIENT_PATH, (c) =>\n c.json({\n client_id: `${URLS.as2}${DEMO_CLIENT_PATH}`,\n client_name: \"XAA demo CIMD client\",\n redirect_uris: [\"http://localhost:8976/callback\", \"https://example.com/callback\"],\n token_endpoint_auth_method: \"none\",\n grant_types: [\"authorization_code\"],\n response_types: [\"code\"],\n }));\n\n// ─── /authorize — authorization_code + PKCE ─────────────────────────────────\n// GET renders a consent page (no user store — a fixed demo identity approves);\n// POST mints the code. The code is a short-lived self-contained JWT signed\n// with the AS key, so nothing has to be persisted between /authorize and\n// /token. CIMD client_ids (https URL) validate redirect_uri against their\n// metadata document; opaque client_ids (stateless DCR — nothing stored to\n// match against) just need an https or loopback redirect_uri.\n\nconst PERSONAL_USER = { sub: \"demo-user\", email: \"jlu@anthropic.com\" };\n\nasync function checkAuthorizeRequest(\n q: Record,\n): Promise<{ ok: true } | { ok: false; error: string; description: string }> {\n if (q.response_type && q.response_type !== \"code\") {\n return { ok: false, error: \"unsupported_response_type\", description: String(q.response_type) };\n }\n if (q.code_challenge_method && q.code_challenge_method !== \"S256\") {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_request\", description: \"only S256 code_challenge_method is supported\" };\n }\n if (isCimdClientId(q.client_id!)) {\n let meta: ClientMetadata;\n try {\n meta = await fetchCimd(q.client_id!);\n } catch (e) {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_client\", description: `client metadata document fetch failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` };\n }\n const registeredRedirects = meta.redirect_uris ?? [];\n let redirectOk = registeredRedirects.includes(q.redirect_uri!);\n if (!redirectOk && registeredRedirects.length === 0) {\n // Loopback client whose metadata we couldn't dereference: allow loopback redirects only.\n try {\n const r = new URL(q.redirect_uri!);\n redirectOk = r.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(r.hostname);\n } catch { /* leave false */ }\n }\n if (!redirectOk) {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_request\", description: \"redirect_uri is not listed in the client metadata document\" };\n }\n } else {\n let redirectOk = false;\n try {\n const r = new URL(q.redirect_uri!);\n redirectOk = r.protocol === \"https:\" || (r.protocol === \"http:\" && isLoopbackHost(r.hostname));\n } catch { /* leave false */ }\n if (!redirectOk) {\n return { ok: false, error: \"invalid_request\", description: \"redirect_uri must be https (or http on loopback)\" };\n }\n }\n return { ok: true };\n}\n\nconst AUTHZ_PARAMS = [\"response_type\", \"client_id\", \"redirect_uri\", \"resource\", \"scope\", \"state\", \"code_challenge\", \"code_challenge_method\"];\nconst escapeHtml = (s: string) =>\n s.replace(/&/g, \"&\").replace(//g, \">\").replace(/\"/g, \""\").replace(/'/g, \"'\");\n\napp.get(\"/authorize\", async (c) => {\n const q = c.req.query();\n // Bare browser visit keeps the explanatory stub.\n if (!q.client_id || !q.redirect_uri) return c.html(xaaAuthorizeStub(URLS.as2, q), 400);\n const check = await checkAuthorizeRequest(q);\n if (!check.ok) {\n console.error(\"[as2] /authorize rejected:\", { ...check, client_id: q.client_id, redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri, resource: q.resource });\n return c.json({ error: check.error, error_description: check.description }, 400);\n }\n\n const hidden = AUTHZ_PARAMS.filter((k) => q[k])\n .map((k) => ``)\n .join(\"\\n\");\n console.log(\"[as2] /authorize consent page:\", { client_id: q.client_id, redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri, scope: q.scope });\n return c.html(`Authorize — AS2\n\n\n

Authorize access

Signed in as ${escapeHtml(PERSONAL_USER.email)} (sub: ${escapeHtml(PERSONAL_USER.sub)})

Client ${escapeHtml(q.client_id)} is requesting:

${escapeHtml(q.scope || \"(no scopes requested)\")}

\n\n

`);\n});\n\napp.post(\"/authorize\", async (c) => {\n const form = await c.req.parseBody();\n const q: Record = {};\n for (const k of AUTHZ_PARAMS) if (typeof form[k] === \"string\") q[k] = form[k] as string;\n if (!q.client_id || !q.redirect_uri) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"client_id and redirect_uri are required\" }, 400);\n }\n const check = await checkAuthorizeRequest(q);\n if (!check.ok) {\n console.error(\"[as2] /authorize (POST) rejected:\", { ...check, client_id: q.client_id, redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri, resource: q.resource });\n return c.json({ error: check.error, error_description: check.description }, 400);\n }\n\n const code = await new jose.SignJWT({\n use: \"authorization_code\",\n client_id: q.client_id,\n redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri,\n resource: q.resource ?? RESOURCES[0],\n ...(q.scope ? { scope: q.scope } : {}),\n ...(q.code_challenge ? { code_challenge: q.code_challenge } : {}),\n })\n .setProtectedHeader({ alg: \"ES256\", kid: kp.kid })\n .setIssuer(URLS.as2)\n .setAudience(`${URLS.as2}/token`)\n .setSubject(PERSONAL_USER.sub)\n .setIssuedAt()\n .setExpirationTime(\"5m\")\n .sign(kp.privateKey);\n\n const target = new URL(q.redirect_uri);\n target.searchParams.set(\"code\", code);\n if (q.state) target.searchParams.set(\"state\", q.state);\n console.log(\"[as2] /authorize approved:\", { client_id: q.client_id, redirect_uri: q.redirect_uri, resource: q.resource, scope: q.scope });\n return c.redirect(target.toString(), 302);\n});\n\n// ─── /register — bring your own client_id ───────────────────────────────────\n// You bring the client_id your IdP will stamp in the JAG (for Okta: the\n// resource app's Okta-issued id; for the demo IdP: your idp_id_...). We give\n// you back a secret bound to (idp_issuer, that_client_id, resource). The\n// secret IS the trust decision — at /token we re-derive it from the JAG's\n// iss + client_id + resource and it has to match.\n\nconst RESOURCES = [`${URLS.rs2}/mcp`];\n\napp.get(\"/register\", (c) =>\n c.html(`Register — AS2\n\n

Register at AS2

We bind a secret to (idp_issuer, client_id, resource). At /token we re-derive the secret from the JAG claims — that's the trust gate. No separate issuer allowlist.

\n`));\n\napp.post(\"/register\", async (c) => {\n const contentType = c.req.header(\"Content-Type\") ?? \"\";\n\n // RFC 7591 DCR (JSON) — toolbox hits this via get_or_register_client_credentials.\n // We don't know the issuer or resource from a standard DCR body, so assume\n // claude.ai + the single RS we front. The derived secret is stateless and\n // will re-derive identically at /token from (JAG.iss, client_id, body.resource).\n if (contentType.includes(\"application/json\")) {\n const body = await c.req.json(); // consume + ignore body (redirect_uris, grant_types, etc.)\n const clientId = `claude_${crypto.randomUUID().slice(0, 12)}`;\n const resource = RESOURCES[0];\n const clientSecret = await deriveAs2Secret(CLAUDE_AI_ISS, clientId, resource);\n return c.json({\n client_id: clientId,\n client_secret: clientSecret,\n client_id_issued_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n grant_types: [JWT_BEARER_GRANT],\n redirect_uris: body.redirect_uris ?? [],\n token_endpoint_auth_method: \"client_secret_post\",\n // echoed so the caller can sanity-check the binding if they care\n _issuer_binding: CLAUDE_AI_ISS,\n _resource_binding: resource,\n }, 201);\n }\n\n // Form POST — manual registration (Okta / demo-IdP path)\n const body = await c.req.parseBody();\n const idpIssuer = (body.idp_issuer as string)?.replace(/\\/$/, \"\");\n const jagClientId = body.jag_client_id as string;\n const resource = body.resource as string;\n if (!idpIssuer || !jagClientId || !resource) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"idp_issuer, jag_client_id, resource required\" }, 400);\n }\n const client_secret = await deriveAs2Secret(idpIssuer, jagClientId, resource);\n return c.json({ client_id: jagClientId, client_secret, idp_issuer: idpIssuer, resource });\n});\n\n// ─── /token — jwt-bearer ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// The secret IS the trust decision. Re-derive from JAG.iss + authenticating\n// client_id + resource; if the presented secret matches, you registered for\n// exactly this tuple. Then verify the JAG sig against that issuer's JWKS.\n\napp.post(\"/token\", async (c) => {\n const body = await c.req.parseBody();\n\n // ── authorization_code + PKCE — the CIMD path. The code is the JWT we\n // signed at /authorize, so verification is local; nothing to look up.\n if (body.grant_type === \"authorization_code\") {\n // Client auth on this grant is client_id binding only (the code is bound\n // to client_id; PKCE is the proof) — secrets aren't verified, so the\n // STATIC_TEST_CLIENT pair works here too.\n let cimdClientId = body.client_id as string | undefined;\n const basicAuthz = c.req.header(\"Authorization\");\n if (!cimdClientId && basicAuthz?.startsWith(\"Basic \")) {\n cimdClientId = decodeURIComponent(atob(basicAuthz.slice(6)).split(\":\")[0]);\n }\n const code = body.code as string | undefined;\n if (!cimdClientId || !code) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"client_id and code are required\" }, 400);\n }\n let codeClaims: jose.JWTPayload;\n try {\n ({ payload: codeClaims } = await jose.jwtVerify(code, kp.publicKey, {\n issuer: URLS.as2,\n audience: `${URLS.as2}/token`,\n }));\n } catch (e) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: `invalid or expired code: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` }, 400);\n }\n if (codeClaims.client_id !== cimdClientId) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"code was issued to a different client_id\" }, 400);\n }\n if (body.redirect_uri && body.redirect_uri !== codeClaims.redirect_uri) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"redirect_uri mismatch\" }, 400);\n }\n if (codeClaims.code_challenge) {\n const verifier = body.code_verifier as string | undefined;\n if (!verifier) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"code_verifier is required (PKCE)\" }, 400);\n }\n const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(\"SHA-256\", new TextEncoder().encode(verifier));\n if (b64url(digest) !== codeClaims.code_challenge) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"PKCE verification failed\" }, 400);\n }\n }\n const aud = (codeClaims.resource as string | undefined) ?? (body.resource as string | undefined) ?? RESOURCES[0];\n const scope = codeClaims.scope as string | undefined;\n const accessToken = await new jose.SignJWT({ client_id: cimdClientId, ...(scope ? { scope } : {}) })\n .setProtectedHeader({ alg: \"ES256\", kid: kp.kid })\n .setIssuer(URLS.as2)\n .setAudience(aud)\n .setSubject(codeClaims.sub!)\n .setIssuedAt()\n .setExpirationTime(\"1h\")\n .sign(kp.privateKey);\n console.log(\"[as2] /token authorization_code (CIMD):\", { client_id: cimdClientId, aud, scope });\n return c.json({ access_token: accessToken, token_type: \"Bearer\", expires_in: 3600, ...(scope ? { scope } : {}) });\n }\n\n if (body.grant_type !== JWT_BEARER_GRANT) {\n return c.json({ error: \"unsupported_grant_type\", error_description: String(body.grant_type) }, 400);\n }\n\n let clientId: string | undefined, clientSecret: string | undefined;\n const authz = c.req.header(\"Authorization\");\n if (authz?.startsWith(\"Basic \")) {\n const decoded = atob(authz.slice(6));\n const sep = decoded.indexOf(\":\");\n clientId = decodeURIComponent(decoded.slice(0, sep));\n clientSecret = decodeURIComponent(decoded.slice(sep + 1));\n } else {\n clientId = body.client_id as string;\n clientSecret = body.client_secret as string;\n }\n // CIMD clients (client_id = https URL) are public — no secret to present.\n const isCimdClient = !!clientId && !clientSecret && isCimdClientId(clientId);\n if (!clientId || (!clientSecret && !isCimdClient)) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_client\", error_description: \"missing client credentials\" }, 401);\n }\n console.log(\"[as2] /token client auth:\", {\n via: isCimdClient ? \"cimd\" : authz?.startsWith(\"Basic \") ? \"basic\" : \"body\",\n client_id: clientId,\n secret_prefix: clientSecret ? clientSecret.slice(0, 12) + \"…\" : \"(none)\",\n body_resource: body.resource,\n body_scope: body.scope,\n });\n\n const assertion = body.assertion as string;\n if (!assertion) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_request\", error_description: \"missing assertion\" }, 400);\n }\n\n // Spec draft says `typ: oauth-id-jag+jwt`. Okta sets it. PyJWT (toolbox)\n // defaults to `typ: JWT` — neither wrong per RFC 7523. Accept either or absent.\n const header = jose.decodeProtectedHeader(assertion);\n if (header.typ && header.typ !== ID_JAG_TYP && header.typ.toLowerCase() !== \"jwt\") {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: `typ must be ${ID_JAG_TYP} or JWT, got ${header.typ}` }, 400);\n }\n\n // Unsafe decode — sig verified below, AFTER the secret check proves we\n // trust this issuer for this client.\n const unverified = jose.decodeJwt(assertion);\n console.log(\"[as2] /token ID-JAG claims:\", { header: { typ: header.typ, alg: header.alg, kid: header.kid }, payload: unverified });\n const iss = (unverified.iss ?? \"\").replace(/\\/$/, \"\");\n if (!iss) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"ID-JAG missing iss\" }, 400);\n }\n // Spec §3.1: `resource` in the JAG is OPTIONAL. Okta may omit it.\n // Fall back to the RFC 8707 request param — CC always sends it.\n const jagResource = (unverified.resource as string | undefined) ?? (body.resource as string | undefined);\n if (!jagResource) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: \"no resource: ID-JAG omits the claim and request lacks the parameter\" }, 400);\n }\n\n // Spec binding — JAG says it's for client_id X, you must be authing as X.\n // Cheap check; do it before crypto.\n if (unverified.client_id !== clientId) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_grant\",\n error_description: `ID-JAG client_id (${unverified.client_id}) != authenticating client (${clientId})`,\n }, 400);\n }\n\n // Trust gate. CIMD clients have no registration step — the client_id binding\n // check above plus the JAG signature check below carry the trust, and the\n // metadata document has to dereference. Registered clients keep the\n // re-derived-secret gate: a match means you registered for exactly this tuple.\n if (clientId === STATIC_TEST_CLIENT.client_id && clientSecret === STATIC_TEST_CLIENT.client_secret) {\n // static test creds — tuple-independent; the JAG client_id binding above still applies\n } else if (isCimdClient) {\n try {\n await fetchCimd(clientId);\n } catch (e) {\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_client\", error_description: `client metadata document fetch failed: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` }, 401);\n }\n } else if (clientSecret !== await deriveAs2Secret(iss, clientId, jagResource)) {\n return c.json({\n error: \"invalid_client\",\n error_description: `secret not bound to (iss=${iss}, client_id, resource). Register at ${URLS.as2}/register`,\n }, 401);\n }\n\n // Now we trust `iss` enough to fetch its keys.\n let claims: jose.JWTPayload;\n try {\n const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(assertion, await jwksFor(iss), {\n issuer: iss,\n // RFC 7523 §3 says token-endpoint URL MAY be the aud. Okta uses the\n // issuer URL; toolbox uses the token endpoint; tenanted discovery may\n // derive a path-scoped variant (/). Tenants are\n // open-ended, so check manually instead of an exact-match list.\n clockTolerance: 30,\n });\n const audList = Array.isArray(payload.aud) ? payload.aud : payload.aud ? [payload.aud] : [];\n if (!audList.some((a) => a === URLS.as2 || a.startsWith(`${URLS.as2}/`))) {\n throw new Error(`unexpected aud ${JSON.stringify(payload.aud)}`);\n }\n claims = payload;\n } catch (e) {\n // DEBUG: jose errors are terse — log header vs configured-key so kid/alg\n // mismatches and double-wrapped JWKS are obvious in the val logs.\n let cfg: unknown;\n try { cfg = CLAUDE_AI_JWK ? JSON.parse(CLAUDE_AI_JWK) : undefined; } catch { cfg = \"\"; }\n console.error(\"[as2] ID-JAG verify failed\", {\n iss,\n tokenHeader: header, // alg + kid the token was signed with\n configuredClaudeJwk: iss === CLAUDE_AI_ISS ? cfg : \"\",\n err: { name: (e as Error)?.name, code: (e as { code?: string })?.code, message: (e as Error)?.message },\n });\n return c.json({ error: \"invalid_grant\", error_description: `ID-JAG verify failed (iss=${iss}): ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}` }, 400);\n }\n\n // RBAC×EMA: surface every scope source so upstream changes are observable.\n // Access token currently carries no scope claim — grant-through is TODO.\n console.log(\"[as2] /token jwt-bearer scopes:\", {\n request_param: body.scope, // RFC 6749 scope param on the token POST\n jag_scope: claims.scope, // space-delimited string form\n jag_scp: claims.scp, // array form (Okta)\n });\n\n const accessToken = await new jose.SignJWT({})\n .setProtectedHeader({ alg: \"ES256\", kid: kp.kid })\n .setIssuer(URLS.as2)\n .setAudience(jagResource)\n .setSubject(claims.sub!)\n .setIssuedAt()\n .setExpirationTime(\"1h\")\n .sign(kp.privateKey);\n\n return c.json({ access_token: accessToken, token_type: \"Bearer\", expires_in: 3600 });\n});\n\n// ─── Debug — demo-IdP path only (can't mint Okta id_tokens) ─────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/debug/context\", async (c) => {\n const idToken = await fetch(`${URLS.idp}/debug/mint-id-token`).then((r) => r.text());\n const { idp, as } = await debugCredsAs2();\n return c.json({\n client_id: as.client_id,\n client_secret: as.client_secret,\n idp_client_id: idp.client_id,\n idp_client_secret: idp.client_secret,\n idp_id_token: idToken,\n idp_token_endpoint: `${URLS.idp}/token`,\n });\n});\n\n// ─── Index ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\napp.get(\"/\", (c) =>\n c.html(indexPage({\n role: \"AS\",\n name: \"xaa-mcp-as2\",\n endpoints: [\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/.well-known/jwks.json\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/demo-client-metadata.json\", note: \"sample CIMD document — use its URL as client_id to try the flow\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/authorize\", note: \"authorization_code + PKCE; CIMD (https URL) or DCR client_ids; consent page approves as the demo user\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/register\", note: \"bring your own client_id; we bind a secret to (iss, id, resource). CIMD clients skip this\" },\n { method: \"POST\", path: \"/token\", note: \"authorization_code + jwt-bearer; CIMD or secret-as-trust\" },\n { method: \"GET\", path: \"/debug/context\", note: \"conformance ctx (demo-IdP path)\" },\n ],\n })));\n\napp.onError((err) => { throw err; });\n\nexport default app.fetch;\nif (import.meta.main) Deno.serve({ port: 3005 }, app.fetch);\n","createdAt",["D",1782947820812],"branchVersion","branchId","5a9509be-4a56-11f1-8b70-ee650bb23af1","id","5a8fc47c-4a56-11f1-8b70-ee650bb23af1","xaa-mcp-as2",["D",1778187017209],"deletedAt","legacyEnvVars","privacy","public","httpPrivacy","description","imageUrl","f6016879-c05b-4822-8e40-a3b6bd7a7e8a","pinnedFileId","pinPreview","pinMigrated","screenshotVersion","likeCount",0,"orgId","019e0433-9f2e-749c-bf05-4b5f5a8e723b","tursoName","tursoHostname","tursoMeasuredAt","pinned","userPerm","r","valPerm","blobPerm","rw","emailPerm","sqlitePerm","projectPerm","telemetryPerm","user",{"_98":97,"_106":102},"org",{"_98":97,"_99":100,"_101":102,"_18":54,"_103":104,"_105":25},"branch",{"_13":83,"_32":84,"_43":42,"_85":44,"_86":87,"_88":89,"_90":50,"_91":92,"_93":94,"_95":45,"_96":97},"isOwned",22,"main","projectId","forkedBranchId","b21dfade-18a0-11f1-8e30-42dde27851f2","forkedBranchVersion",20,"forkedProjectPrivacy","forkedProjectId","b21da020-18a0-11f1-8e30-42dde27851f2","forkedProjectOrgId","1d3af61b-92b3-4fbf-b22a-ca08b2122f4d","projectName","userHandle","jlu","handle","displayName","Justin Lu","avatar","https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/a/ACg8ocK3SYoizVYImoeptY6sq74_q6gNsNUG1dJKtPCpRH1O99Wt0eQ=s96-c","tier","free","canRestrictVals","profileImageUrl","branchName","","adoptOrgId",{"_43":44,"_32":45,"_38":210,"_47":-5,"_48":25,"_49":50,"_51":50,"_52":-5,"_53":-5,"_18":54,"_55":-5,"_56":25,"_57":-5,"_58":-5,"_59":60,"_61":62,"_63":-5,"_64":-5,"_65":-5,"_66":-5,"_67":68,"_69":68,"_70":71,"_72":71,"_73":71,"_74":68,"_75":68,"_76":211,"_78":212,"_80":213,"_82":25},"tree",[167,172],"files",[167,168,169,170,171,172],"counts",{"_157":60,"_158":153,"_159":153,"_160":161,"_162":163},"contents",[140,141],"upstreamProject",{"_43":92,"_32":45,"_52":-5,"_53":-5,"_49":50,"_76":138},"upstreamBranch",{"_43":87,"_38":132,"_133":134,"_32":84,"_85":92,"_13":89,"_86":-5,"_88":-5,"_135":136,"_47":-5,"_82":25,"_49":50,"_96":137,"_61":94,"_95":45},"emptyEnvVars","flags",[],"hasHttpFiles",true,"grants","orgs","customDomains",{},["D",1772721388727],"updatedAt",["D",1777487960793],"lockfileKey","1777488155127-esm.town_v_pcarleton_xaa-mcp-as2@20-main","pcarleton",{"_98":137,"_106":139},"https://img.clerk.com/eyJ0eXBlIjoicHJveHkiLCJzcmMiOiJodHRwczovL2ltYWdlcy5jbGVyay5kZXYvb2F1dGhfZ2l0aHViL2ltZ18yZjg2YXM0MEVRM0hKQzVqcFJ5aHZteXUxUjUifQ",{"_43":150,"_32":151,"_30":152,"_143":-5,"_41":42,"_40":153,"_144":127,"_38":154,"_13":60,"_33":155,"_35":-5,"_24":25,"_147":-5,"_27":156},{"_43":142,"_32":28,"_30":31,"_143":-5,"_41":42,"_40":14,"_144":25,"_38":145,"_13":146,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_24":25,"_147":148,"_27":149},"aa9d6a3d-08f5-43f3-8b24-b38c4ee1c83a","parentId","latest",["D",1782947820812],16,"label","xaa-mcp-as2-jlu",[28],"5a999e3e-4a56-11f1-8b70-ee650bb23af1","shared","019e0434-9c35-77e8-8c2a-fef4caef2a80",1,["D",1778187017209],"directory",[151],"pulls","branches","forks","envVars",{"_164":153,"_166":153},"connections",{"_164":60,"_165":60},"count","unfilledCount","emptyCount",{"_43":150,"_32":151,"_30":152,"_143":-5,"_41":42,"_40":153,"_144":127,"_38":207,"_13":60,"_33":155,"_35":-5,"_24":25,"_147":-5,"_174":208,"_27":209},{"_43":199,"_32":200,"_30":201,"_143":152,"_41":42,"_40":202,"_144":127,"_38":203,"_13":153,"_33":181,"_35":204,"_24":25,"_147":-5,"_174":205,"_27":206},{"_43":192,"_32":193,"_30":194,"_143":152,"_41":42,"_40":153,"_144":127,"_38":195,"_13":60,"_33":181,"_35":196,"_24":25,"_147":-5,"_174":197,"_27":198},{"_43":185,"_32":186,"_30":187,"_143":152,"_41":42,"_40":153,"_144":127,"_38":188,"_13":60,"_33":181,"_35":189,"_24":25,"_147":-5,"_174":190,"_27":191},{"_43":177,"_32":178,"_30":179,"_143":152,"_41":42,"_40":153,"_144":127,"_38":180,"_13":60,"_33":181,"_35":182,"_24":25,"_147":-5,"_174":183,"_27":184},{"_43":142,"_32":28,"_30":31,"_143":-5,"_41":42,"_40":14,"_144":25,"_38":173,"_13":146,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_24":25,"_147":148,"_174":175,"_27":176},["D",1782947820812],"children",[],[28],"5a997d50-4a56-11f1-8b70-ee650bb23af1","register.ts","019e0434-9c34-729f-86c9-0cc43b780ec6",["D",1778187017209],"script","/**\n * Stateless client registration via HMAC.\n *\n * client_id = _id_\n * client_secret = _sec_\n *\n * The prefix makes it obvious at a glance which server issued which cred.\n * Secret is keyed off the full client_id (prefix included) so the prefix\n * is authenticated — you can't swap an idp_id_ for an as1_id_ and have\n * the secret still validate.\n *\n * Nothing is stored. Validation is re-derivation. The redirect_uri is the\n * account key: register the same URI at IdP and AS → two distinct IDs, but\n * the IdP can re-derive the AS one because it knows both issuers and the URI.\n */\n\nimport { URLS } from \"./config.ts\";\n\n// Per-server prefixes. The IdP needs to know the AS's prefix too — it's part\n// of what deriveAsClientIdFor uses to match what the AS /register emitted.\nexport const IDP_PREFIX = \"idp\";\nexport const AS_PREFIX = \"as1\";\n\nconst KEY = \"xaa-demo-hmac-key-not-secret\";\nconst enc = new TextEncoder();\n\nlet hmacKey: CryptoKey | undefined;\nasync function key(): Promise {\n return hmacKey ??= await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n \"raw\", enc.encode(KEY), { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\"sign\"],\n );\n}\n\nasync function hmacHex(input: string): Promise {\n const sig = await crypto.subtle.sign(\"HMAC\", await key(), enc.encode(input));\n return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig), (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, \"0\")).join(\"\");\n}\n\n/**\n * `resource` (RS URL) is the per-RS dimension: same redirect_uri + same AS,\n * different resource → different client_id. The IdP has all three inputs at\n * token-exchange time (reg_uri in id_token, audience + resource in request).\n * For the IdP's own client_ids it's empty — the IdP doesn't front a resource.\n */\nexport async function deriveClientId(prefix: string, issuer: string, redirectUri: string, resource = \"\"): Promise {\n return `${prefix}_id_${(await hmacHex(`${issuer}|${redirectUri}|${resource}`)).slice(0, 12)}`;\n}\n\nexport async function deriveClientSecret(clientId: string): Promise {\n // Secret keys off the full client_id — prefix is bound, not cosmetic.\n const prefix = clientId.split(\"_id_\")[0];\n return `${prefix}_sec_${(await hmacHex(clientId)).slice(0, 16)}`;\n}\n\n/** /register: inputs in, creds out. Same inputs → same creds (idempotent). */\nexport async function register(prefix: string, issuer: string, redirectUri: string, resource = \"\") {\n const client_id = await deriveClientId(prefix, issuer, redirectUri, resource);\n const client_secret = await deriveClientSecret(client_id);\n return { client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri: redirectUri, ...(resource && { resource }) };\n}\n\n/** Validate a (client_id, client_secret) pair without knowing the redirect_uri. */\nexport async function validateSecret(clientId: string, clientSecret: string): Promise {\n return clientSecret === await deriveClientSecret(clientId);\n}\n\n/** Validate that a client_id was issued for a given redirect_uri at a given issuer. */\nexport async function validateRedirect(prefix: string, issuer: string, clientId: string, redirectUri: string): Promise {\n return clientId === await deriveClientId(prefix, issuer, redirectUri);\n}\n\n/**\n * The IdP's \"what client_id do I stamp in the JAG\" decision. Depends on how\n * the target AS models clients:\n *\n * - as1: AS mints its own IDs. IdP re-derives by running the same HMAC\n * the AS ran at /register, keyed on the client's redirect_uri.\n *\n * - as2: Client brings their own ID — whatever their IdP knows them as.\n * (Matches Okta's model: the catalog app stamps its own Okta client_id.)\n * The demo IdP plays along by stamping the requester's IdP client_id,\n * which it has right there in the token-exchange request body. The AS\n * never re-derives the id; it re-derives the *secret*, which is bound\n * to (iss, client_id, resource).\n */\nconst AS_REGISTRY: Record = {\n [URLS.as]: { mode: \"derive\", prefix: AS_PREFIX },\n [URLS.as2]: { mode: \"passthrough\" },\n};\n\nexport async function deriveAsClientIdFor(\n asIssuer: string,\n redirectUri: string,\n resource: string,\n requesterClientId: string,\n): Promise {\n const spec = AS_REGISTRY[asIssuer] ?? AS_REGISTRY[asIssuer.replace(/\\/$/, \"\")];\n if (!spec) throw new Error(`unknown AS audience: ${asIssuer}`);\n if (spec.mode === \"passthrough\") return requesterClientId;\n return deriveClientId(spec.prefix, asIssuer, redirectUri, resource);\n}\n\n/**\n * as2 secret derivation. Binds the secret to the full (issuer, client_id,\n * resource) tuple — the secret IS the trust decision. The client_id is\n * IdP-controlled (whatever Okta stamps); the secret is us-controlled.\n */\nexport async function deriveAs2Secret(idpIssuer: string, clientId: string, resource: string): Promise {\n return `as2_sec_${(await hmacHex(`${idpIssuer}|${clientId}|${resource}`)).slice(0, 16)}`;\n}\n\n/** Canonical redirect_uri for /debug endpoints — matches CC's default port. */\nexport const DEBUG_REDIRECT_URI = \"http://localhost:52118/callback\";\n\n/**\n * Pre-derived creds for /debug/context. AS creds are bound to the todos RS —\n * to get creds for cal, POST /register at the AS with resource=.\n */\nexport async function debugCreds() {\n const idp = await register(IDP_PREFIX, URLS.idp, DEBUG_REDIRECT_URI);\n const as = await register(AS_PREFIX, URLS.as, DEBUG_REDIRECT_URI, `${URLS.rs}/mcp`);\n return { idp, as };\n}\n\n/**\n * Creds for conformance against as2 via the demo IdP. The AS client_id IS the\n * IdP client_id (that's what the demo IdP stamps in the JAG — passthrough mode).\n */\nexport async function debugCredsAs2() {\n const idp = await register(IDP_PREFIX, URLS.idp, DEBUG_REDIRECT_URI);\n const as = {\n client_id: idp.client_id,\n client_secret: await deriveAs2Secret(URLS.idp, idp.client_id, `${URLS.rs2}/mcp`),\n };\n return { idp, as };\n}\n",[],[151,178],"5a997080-4a56-11f1-8b70-ee650bb23af1","keys.ts","019e0434-9c34-729f-86c9-098f981b2310",["D",1778187017209],"/**\n * Keypair persistence. Val.town is stateless per-request; keys must survive.\n *\n * - On val.town: blob storage (getJSON/setJSON the private JWK)\n * - Local dev: in-memory (process lifetime — fine for --watch; ephemeral\n * means restarting one server invalidates tokens the others hold, which is\n * an acceptable dev quirk)\n */\n\nimport * as jose from \"npm:jose@5\";\nimport { ON_VALTOWN } from \"./config.ts\";\n\nexport interface Keypair {\n privateKey: jose.KeyLike;\n publicKey: jose.KeyLike;\n publicJwk: jose.JWK;\n kid: string;\n}\n\nconst localCache = new Map();\n\nasync function materialize(privateJwk: jose.JWK): Promise {\n const privateKey = await jose.importJWK(privateJwk, \"ES256\") as jose.KeyLike;\n // Public JWK = private JWK minus the private component\n const { d: _d, ...pub } = privateJwk;\n const publicJwk = pub as jose.JWK;\n const publicKey = await jose.importJWK(publicJwk, \"ES256\") as jose.KeyLike;\n const kid = await jose.calculateJwkThumbprint(publicJwk);\n return { privateKey, publicKey, publicJwk: { ...publicJwk, kid, use: \"sig\", alg: \"ES256\" }, kid };\n}\n\nasync function generate(): Promise {\n const { privateKey } = await jose.generateKeyPair(\"ES256\", { extractable: true });\n return await jose.exportJWK(privateKey);\n}\n\nexport async function getOrCreateKeypair(blobKey: string): Promise {\n if (ON_VALTOWN) {\n const { blob } = await import(\"https://esm.town/v/std/blob\");\n let jwk = await blob.getJSON(blobKey) as jose.JWK | undefined;\n if (!jwk) {\n jwk = await generate();\n await blob.setJSON(blobKey, jwk);\n }\n return materialize(jwk);\n }\n\n // Local: cache for process lifetime\n const cached = localCache.get(blobKey);\n if (cached) return cached;\n const kp = await materialize(await generate());\n localCache.set(blobKey, kp);\n console.warn(`[keys] ${blobKey}: ephemeral key (kid=${kp.kid.slice(0, 12)}…), lives until process restart`);\n return kp;\n}\n",[],[151,186],"5a99506e-4a56-11f1-8b70-ee650bb23af1","html.ts","019e0434-9c34-729f-86c9-05b9594baea1",["D",1778187017209],"/** Shared HTML templates. */\n\nconst esc = (s: string) => s.replace(/[&<>\"']/g, (c) => `&#${c.charCodeAt(0)};`);\n\n/**\n * Informational stub for an AS /authorize endpoint. XAA AS's are jwt-bearer\n * only — there is no interactive code flow — but SDK schema validation forces\n * us to advertise an authorization_endpoint. Rather than 404 or (worse) point\n * at the IdP's real /authorize, we land you here and explain.\n */\nexport function xaaAuthorizeStub(asUrl: string, query: Record): string {\n const rows = Object.entries(query)\n .map(([k, v]) => `${esc(k)}${esc(v)}`)\n .join(\"\");\n return `/authorize — not supported\n\n

This AS doesn't do `/authorize`

${esc(asUrl)} is an XAA (cross-app access) authorization server. It only supports\ngrant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer at\n/token — there's no interactive authorization-code flow.

The authorization_endpoint in our metadata exists only because some client schemas\nrequire the field. If your client redirected you here, it's trying to run a code flow against an\nAS that can't issue codes — check that it's using the jwt-bearer grant.

Request parameters received

\n${rows ? `${rows}

` : `

(none)

`}\n`;\n}\n\nexport function indexPage(opts: {\n role: \"IdP\" | \"AS\" | \"RS\";\n name: string;\n endpoints: { method: string; path: string; note?: string }[];\n}): string {\n const colors = {\n IdP: { bg: \"#fef3c7\", accent: \"#f59e0b\" },\n AS: { bg: \"#dbeafe\", accent: \"#3b82f6\" },\n RS: { bg: \"#d1fae5\", accent: \"#10b981\" },\n }[opts.role];\n\n const rows = opts.endpoints\n .map((e) => {\n const label = `${e.method} ${e.path}`;\n const link = e.method === \"GET\" ? `${label}` : label;\n return `

${link}${e.note ? ` — ${e.note}` : \"\"}

`;\n })\n .join(\"\\n\");\n\n return `\n${opts.name}

${opts.role}

${opts.name}

\n${rows}\n

`;\n}\n",[],[151,193],"2254ac5a-5b16-11f1-b16b-ee650bb23af1","config.ts","019e0434-9c34-729f-86c9-02204c03f726",2,["D",1780028604779],"/**\n * Wiring for the XAA demo stack. Client creds are NOT hardcoded — they\n * come from /register (see register.ts). The IdP and AS issue distinct\n * client_ids because each bakes its own issuer into the HMAC input.\n */\n\nexport const OKTA_ISSUER = \"https://integrator-7089468.okta.com\";\n\nexport const DEMO_USER = {\n sub: \"demo@example.com\",\n email: \"demo@example.com\",\n name: \"Demo User\",\n};\n\n// \"Am I on val.town?\" — esm.town serves deployed code\nexport const ON_VALTOWN = import.meta.url.startsWith(\"https://esm.town\");\n\nexport const URLS = ON_VALTOWN\n ? {\n idp: \"https://xaa-mcp-idp.val.run\",\n as: \"https://xaa-mcp-as.val.run\",\n rs: \"https://xaa-mcp-rs.val.run\",\n cal: \"https://xaa-mcp-cal.val.run\",\n as2: \"https://xaa-mcp-as2-jlu.val.run\",\n rs2: \"https://xaa-mcp-rs2-jlu.val.run\",\n }\n : {\n idp: \"http://localhost:3001\",\n as: \"http://localhost:3002\",\n rs: \"http://localhost:3000\",\n cal: \"http://localhost:3003\",\n as2: \"http://localhost:3005\",\n rs2: \"http://localhost:3004\",\n };\n",[],[151,200],["D",1778187017209],[168,169,170,171],[151],["D",1778187017209],{"_98":97,"_106":102},{"_98":97,"_99":100,"_101":102,"_18":54,"_103":104,"_105":25},{"_13":83,"_32":84,"_43":42,"_85":44,"_86":87,"_88":89,"_90":50,"_91":92,"_93":94,"_95":45,"_96":97},"ctx",{"_76":-5,"_129":247,"_248":249,"_250":251,"_252":25,"_253":25,"_254":25,"_255":127,"_256":-5,"_257":-7,"_258":-7,"_259":60,"_260":25,"_261":25,"_262":-5,"_263":25,"_264":25,"_265":25,"_266":-5},"ENV",{"_218":219,"_220":221,"_222":84,"_223":224,"_225":226,"_227":228,"_229":230,"_231":232,"_233":234,"_235":236,"_237":238,"_239":240,"_241":242,"_243":244,"_245":246},"REACT_APP_SENTRY_DSN","https://586020d86f05489db63a554690acf1e9@o1398359.ingest.sentry.io/6724499","RENDER_GIT_COMMIT","fdb67791413f4386b4dbf18f354029a617f6160f","RENDER_GIT_BRANCH","POSTHOG_API_TOKEN","phc_nmoyuAkStEZuUp69rYlg1DZgrIt19Gx0Y4Hwf8tGgJP","POSTHOG_API_HOST","https://wart.val.town","WEB_API_TEMPLATE","https://{val}.web.val.run","APP_URL","https://www.val.town","MODULE_URL","https://esm.town","VANITY_WEB_API_TEMPLATE","https://{label}.val.run/","DENOLS_URL","https://lsp.val.town","NODE_ENV","production","CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY","0x4AAAAAACtaIZJH7s9rBMZ6","GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID","875989696899-jtsqkhlbdv5jrlsk8631p7ipjg3c6o62.apps.googleusercontent.com","STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY","pk_live_51N2zvWEpZTTLipIkVEwXrUG9AT0yeOOEYxszarZT1jpsZV58Ly6wlg3SltZpHN26CUalOBmUSY7adQRQiSkCZz2500qSXNkf8Y","API_URL","https://api.val.town",[],"preferencesKeybindings","default","preferencesTheme","light","preferencesFixers","preferencesCopilot","preferencesSelectionAi","preferencesCloseBrackets","preferencesChatPanelState","preferencesDprint","preferencesDenofmt","notificationCount","flagDenols","isBusinessOrgMember","businessOrgHandle","isBusinessOrgAdmin","isHigherTownieTier","navCollapsed","currentOrgId"]

Authorize access

Register at AS2

Authorize access

Register at AS2

This AS doesn't do /authorize

Request parameters received

${opts.name}

This AS doesn't do `/authorize`

Diff · v18