[{"_1":2,"_3":-5,"_4":-5},"loaderData",{"_5":6,"_7":8,"_9":10},"actionData","errors","root",{"_158":159,"_160":161},"routes/_app.x.$handle.$name",{"_99":98,"_32":45,"_107":89,"_27":101,"_13":14,"_108":-5,"_11":109,"_110":111,"_112":113,"_114":115,"_116":117,"_20":-5,"_118":-5,"_119":-5,"_120":25,"_121":122,"_123":58,"_124":-5,"_125":-5,"_126":127},"routes/_app.x.$handle.$name.branch.$branch.version.$version.diff",{"_11":12,"_13":14,"_15":16,"_17":-5,"_18":-5},"project",{"_43":44,"_32":45,"_38":46,"_47":-5,"_48":25,"_49":50,"_51":50,"_52":53,"_54":-5,"_18":55,"_56":31,"_57":58,"_59":-5,"_60":-5,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":70,"_71":-5,"_72":73,"_74":73,"_75":76,"_77":76,"_78":76,"_79":73,"_80":73,"_81":82,"_83":84,"_85":86,"_87":25},"version",9,"changes",[19],"aiChatInfo","userId",{"_20":21,"_22":23,"_24":25,"_26":25,"_27":28,"_29":28},"file",{"_30":31,"_32":28,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_38":39,"_40":14,"_41":42,"_24":25},"previous",{"_30":31,"_32":28,"_33":34,"_35":36},"deleted",false,"deletedHere","path","main.ts","latestPath","fileId","ac1dba4e-aa8f-11f1-9f6b-1607ee4eb77e","name","fileType","http","content","/**\n * Webhook recorder — a lossless capture endpoint for inspecting inbound deliveries.\n *\n * Records each delivery byte-exact (all headers, body as base64) so the raw wire\n * format can be inspected afterwards. Some providers verify ownership of an endpoint\n * by posting a challenge value that must be echoed back; that is handled below.\n *\n * Design rules:\n * 1. A recorded path ALWAYS answers 200. Providers commonly treat any other status\n * as a failed verification and refuse to register the endpoint, so storage\n * errors are swallowed and surfaced through GET /stats instead. The sqlite\n * import is dynamic for the same reason: a module-load failure must not take\n * the handler down with it.\n * 2. Bodies are stored base64, never as text — payloads may be binary or encrypted,\n * and decoding as UTF-8 would corrupt them.\n *\n * Routes:\n * ANY /h/// record; echo a challenge if present\n * ANY /h/... (wrong token) 200 {\"ok\":true}, not recorded\n * GET /events read back (header: X-Read-Token)\n * GET /stats counts + errors (header: X-Read-Token)\n * GET / health, unauthenticated\n *\n * `env` is the first path segment after the token. The sender cannot be trusted to\n * identify its own origin — its JWT `iss` is identical across environments — so the\n * environment is stamped into the URL we register, and cross-checked against which\n * per-environment secret verifies the signature.\n *\n * Env vars (set in the UI — never in this source, which is public on a free account):\n * READ_TOKEN required — guards /events and /stats\n * HOOK_PATH_TOKEN required — the secret segment in the recording path\n * SECRET_ optional — e.g. SECRET_STG / SECRET_PRD. When set, the inbound\n * Authorization JWT is verified against each and the matching\n * environment recorded in `sig_env`.\n */\n\nconst TABLE = \"deliveries_v1\";\n\n// Correlation keys lifted out of the event body. Added by migration so an existing\n// table is upgraded in place.\nconst EXTRA_COLS = [\n \"env TEXT\", \"topic TEXT\", \"sig_env TEXT\",\n \"event_id TEXT\", \"subscription_id TEXT\", \"event_topic TEXT\",\n \"resource_type TEXT\", \"resource_id TEXT\", \"resource_state TEXT\",\n \"job_id TEXT\", \"order_id TEXT\", \"channel_id TEXT\", \"channel_name TEXT\",\n \"company_ext_id TEXT\", \"external_job_id TEXT\", \"occurred_at TEXT\",\n \"posting_count INTEGER\",\n];\n\nlet dbPromise: Promise | null = null;\nlet lastError: string | null = null;\n\nasync function db() {\n if (!dbPromise) {\n dbPromise = (async () => {\n // Val-scoped database. Do not switch this to std/sqlite/global.ts — it\n // would point the val at a different database.\n const { sqlite } = await import(\"https://esm.town/v/std/sqlite/main.ts\");\n await sqlite.execute(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ${TABLE} (\n id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n received_at TEXT NOT NULL,\n label TEXT NOT NULL,\n method TEXT NOT NULL,\n query TEXT NOT NULL,\n kind TEXT NOT NULL,\n tags TEXT,\n answered INTEGER NOT NULL,\n headers TEXT NOT NULL,\n body_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,\n body_len INTEGER NOT NULL\n )`);\n // Additive migrations. Each is independent so a re-run is harmless.\n for (const col of EXTRA_COLS) {\n try {\n await sqlite.execute(`ALTER TABLE ${TABLE} ADD COLUMN ${col}`);\n } catch { /* already present */ }\n }\n // Backfill rows captured before env/topic existed: those labels carry no\n // \"/\" prefix. The two local smoke tests are marked 'test'.\n await sqlite.execute(\n `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET env = CASE\n WHEN label IN ('selftest','opaque-test') THEN 'test' ELSE 'stg' END,\n topic = label\n WHERE env IS NULL AND label NOT LIKE '%/%'`,\n );\n return sqlite;\n })().catch((e) => {\n dbPromise = null; // let the next request retry the import\n throw e;\n });\n }\n return dbPromise;\n}\n\nfunction toB64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n let s = \"\";\n const CHUNK = 0x8000;\n for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += CHUNK) {\n s += String.fromCharCode(...bytes.subarray(i, i + CHUNK));\n }\n return btoa(s);\n}\n\n/** Best-effort JSON parse. Binary or encrypted bodies simply won't parse. */\nfunction tryJson(bytes: Uint8Array): any | null {\n try {\n return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder(\"utf-8\", { fatal: true }).decode(bytes));\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n}\n\nfunction json(body: unknown, status = 200) {\n return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {\n status,\n headers: { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" },\n });\n}\n\n/** Length-independent compare, so a wrong token leaks nothing through timing. */\nfunction tokenEq(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n if (!a || !b || a.length !== b.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);\n return diff === 0;\n}\n\nfunction b64uToBytes(s: string): Uint8Array {\n const b64 = s.replace(/-/g, \"+\").replace(/_/g, \"/\") + \"=\".repeat((4 - s.length % 4) % 4);\n return Uint8Array.from(atob(b64), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n\n/**\n * Which environment's webhook secret validates this JWT?\n * Returns the env suffix of the matching SECRET_ var, \"none\" if a token was\n * present but matched nothing, or null when no secrets are configured.\n */\nasync function signatureEnv(authorization: string | null): Promise {\n const jwt = (authorization ?? \"\").replace(/^Bearer\\s+/i, \"\");\n const parts = jwt.split(\".\");\n if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n\n const candidates: [string, string][] = [];\n for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(Deno.env.toObject())) {\n if (k.startsWith(\"SECRET_\") && v) candidates.push([k.slice(7).toLowerCase(), v]);\n }\n if (!candidates.length) return null;\n\n const msg = new TextEncoder().encode(`${parts[0]}.${parts[1]}`);\n let sig: Uint8Array;\n try {\n sig = b64uToBytes(parts[2]);\n } catch {\n return \"none\";\n }\n for (const [env, secret] of candidates) {\n try {\n const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n \"raw\", new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\"verify\"],\n );\n if (await crypto.subtle.verify(\"HMAC\", key, sig, msg)) return env;\n } catch { /* try the next candidate */ }\n }\n return \"none\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the correlation keys out of a parsed event envelope.\n * `resource.occurred_at` is preferred over the attribute-level one: it is UTC,\n * whereas `attributes.occurred_at` carries a local offset, and only the former is\n * safe to sort on. Delivery order does NOT match occurrence order.\n */\nfunction correlate(parsed: any): Record {\n const a = parsed?.data?.attributes ?? {};\n const r = a.resource ?? {};\n const postings = Array.isArray(r.postings) ? r.postings : null;\n return {\n event_id: parsed?.data?.id ?? null,\n subscription_id: a.subscription_id ?? null,\n event_topic: Array.isArray(a.topics) ? a.topics[0] ?? null : null,\n resource_type: r.type ?? null,\n resource_id: r.id ?? null,\n resource_state: r.state ?? null,\n job_id: r.job_id ?? null,\n // A posting carries order_id directly; an order event carries its own id.\n order_id: r.order_id ?? (r.type === \"order\" ? r.id ?? null : null),\n channel_id: r.channel_id ?? null,\n channel_name: r.channel_name ?? null,\n company_ext_id: r.company_id ?? null,\n external_job_id: r.external_job_id ?? null,\n occurred_at: r.occurred_at ?? a.occurred_at ?? null,\n posting_count: postings ? postings.length : null,\n };\n}\n\nexport default async function (req: Request): Promise {\n const url = new URL(req.url);\n const path = url.pathname;\n const readToken = Deno.env.get(\"READ_TOKEN\") ?? \"\";\n const pathToken = Deno.env.get(\"HOOK_PATH_TOKEN\") ?? \"\";\n\n // ---- health -------------------------------------------------------------\n if (path === \"/\" || path === \"\") {\n let storage = \"ok\";\n try {\n await db();\n } catch (e) {\n storage = `error: ${String(e)}`;\n }\n const secrets = Object.keys(Deno.env.toObject())\n .filter((k) => k.startsWith(\"SECRET_\")).map((k) => k.slice(7).toLowerCase()).sort();\n return json({\n ok: true,\n storage,\n configured: { read_token: !!readToken, path_token: !!pathToken, secrets },\n last_write_error: lastError,\n });\n }\n\n // ---- read-back ----------------------------------------------------------\n if (path === \"/events\" || path === \"/stats\") {\n if (!tokenEq(req.headers.get(\"x-read-token\") ?? \"\", readToken)) {\n return json({ error: \"forbidden\" }, 403);\n }\n try {\n const sqlite = await db();\n if (path === \"/stats\") {\n const grouped = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT env, kind, event_topic, resource_state, sig_env,\n COUNT(*) AS n, MAX(received_at) AS latest\n FROM ${TABLE} GROUP BY env, kind, event_topic, resource_state, sig_env\n ORDER BY env, kind, event_topic`,\n );\n const orders = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT env, order_id, external_job_id, COUNT(*) AS events,\n COUNT(DISTINCT resource_id) AS resources, MIN(occurred_at) AS first_at\n FROM ${TABLE} WHERE order_id IS NOT NULL\n GROUP BY env, order_id, external_job_id ORDER BY first_at`,\n );\n const total = await sqlite.execute(`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM ${TABLE}`);\n return json({\n total: total.rows?.[0]?.n ?? 0,\n breakdown: grouped.rows ?? [],\n by_order: orders.rows ?? [],\n last_write_error: lastError,\n });\n }\n // Filters compose: env, order, resource, topic, kind, job, since.\n const since = Number(url.searchParams.get(\"since\") ?? \"0\") || 0;\n const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get(\"limit\") ?? \"50\") || 50, 200);\n const where = [\"id > ?\"];\n const args: unknown[] = [since];\n for (const [param, col] of [\n [\"env\", \"env\"], [\"order\", \"order_id\"], [\"resource\", \"resource_id\"],\n [\"topic\", \"event_topic\"], [\"kind\", \"kind\"], [\"job\", \"external_job_id\"],\n ] as const) {\n const v = url.searchParams.get(param);\n if (v) { where.push(`${col} = ?`); args.push(v); }\n }\n if (url.searchParams.get(\"nobody\")) {\n // Correlation view: skip the payload entirely, ordered by OCCURRENCE.\n const res = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT id, received_at, env, kind, event_topic, resource_type,\n resource_id, resource_state, order_id, channel_name,\n external_job_id, occurred_at, posting_count, sig_env, body_len\n FROM ${TABLE} WHERE ${where.join(\" AND \")}\n ORDER BY COALESCE(occurred_at, received_at) ASC LIMIT ?`,\n args: [...args, limit],\n });\n return json({ events: res.rows ?? [], last_write_error: lastError });\n }\n const res = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT * FROM ${TABLE} WHERE ${where.join(\" AND \")}\n ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT ?`,\n args: [...args, limit],\n });\n // std/sqlite returns rows as keyed objects, so decode the JSON columns\n // rather than indexing positionally.\n return json({\n events: (res.rows ?? []).map((r: any) => ({\n ...r,\n answered: !!r.answered,\n tags: r.tags ? JSON.parse(r.tags) : null,\n headers: JSON.parse(r.headers),\n })),\n last_write_error: lastError,\n });\n } catch (e) {\n return json({ error: String(e) }, 500);\n }\n }\n\n // ---- recording path -----------------------------------------------------\n // Shape: /h///. Everything from here on returns 200.\n const seg = path.replace(/^\\/+/, \"\").split(\"/\");\n const authorized = seg[0] === \"h\" && tokenEq(seg[1] ?? \"\", pathToken);\n if (!authorized) {\n // Deliberately indistinguishable from a successful delivery: an unauthorized\n // caller learns nothing about whether the path token was close.\n return json({ ok: true });\n }\n const rest = seg.slice(2);\n const label = rest.join(\"/\") || \"unlabelled\";\n // Two or more segments => /. A single segment is an un-namespaced\n // caller; record it rather than dropping it, but do not guess its environment.\n const env = rest.length >= 2 ? rest[0] : \"unknown\";\n const topic = rest.length >= 2 ? rest.slice(1).join(\"/\") : label;\n\n let bytes = new Uint8Array(0);\n try {\n bytes = new Uint8Array(await req.arrayBuffer());\n } catch { /* an empty/unreadable body still gets a 200 */ }\n\n const parsed = tryJson(bytes);\n const attrs = parsed?.data?.attributes ?? {};\n // Presence of a challenge value is the only reliable discriminator: the rest of\n // the envelope is not guaranteed to be present on a verification request.\n const challenge = attrs.challenge ?? parsed?.challenge ?? null;\n const kind = challenge ? \"verification\" : parsed ? \"event\" : \"opaque\";\n const tags = Array.isArray(attrs.topics) ? attrs.topics : null;\n const c = correlate(parsed);\n\n let sigEnv: string | null = null;\n try {\n sigEnv = await signatureEnv(req.headers.get(\"authorization\"));\n } catch { /* never let verification break the 200 */ }\n\n try {\n const sqlite = await db();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `INSERT INTO ${TABLE}\n (received_at,env,topic,label,method,query,kind,tags,answered,sig_env,\n headers,body_b64,body_len)\n VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`,\n args: [\n new Date().toISOString(), env, topic, label, req.method, url.search, kind,\n tags ? JSON.stringify(tags) : null, challenge ? 1 : 0, sigEnv,\n JSON.stringify(Object.fromEntries(req.headers)), toB64(bytes), bytes.length,\n ],\n });\n lastError = null;\n } catch (e) {\n lastError = `${new Date().toISOString()} ${String(e)}`;\n }\n\n if (challenge) return json({ challenge });\n return json({ ok: true });\n}\n","/**\n * Webhook recorder — a lossless capture endpoint for inspecting inbound deliveries.\n *\n * Records each delivery byte-exact (all headers, body as base64) so the raw wire\n * format can be inspected afterwards. Some providers verify ownership of an endpoint\n * by posting a challenge value that must be echoed back; that is handled below.\n *\n * Design rules:\n * 1. A recorded path ALWAYS answers 200. Providers commonly treat any other status\n * as a failed verification and refuse to register the endpoint, so storage\n * errors are swallowed and surfaced through GET /stats instead. The sqlite\n * import is dynamic for the same reason: a module-load failure must not take\n * the handler down with it.\n * 2. Bodies are stored base64, never as text — payloads may be binary or encrypted,\n * and decoding as UTF-8 would corrupt them.\n *\n * Routes:\n * ANY /h/// record; echo a challenge if present\n * ANY /h/... (wrong token) 200 {\"ok\":true}, not recorded\n * GET /events read back (header: X-Read-Token)\n * GET /stats counts + errors (header: X-Read-Token)\n * GET / health, unauthenticated\n *\n * `env` is the first path segment after the token. The sender cannot be trusted to\n * identify its own origin — its JWT `iss` is identical across environments — so the\n * environment is stamped into the URL we register, and cross-checked against which\n * per-environment secret verifies the signature.\n *\n * Env vars (set in the UI — never in this source, which is public on a free account):\n * READ_TOKEN required — guards /events and /stats\n * HOOK_PATH_TOKEN required — the secret segment in the recording path\n * SECRET_ optional — e.g. SECRET_STG / SECRET_PRD. When set, the inbound\n * Authorization JWT is verified against each and the matching\n * environment recorded in `sig_env`.\n */\n\nconst TABLE = \"deliveries_v1\";\n\n// Correlation keys lifted out of the event body. Added by migration so an existing\n// table is upgraded in place.\nconst EXTRA_COLS = [\n \"env TEXT\", \"topic TEXT\", \"sig_env TEXT\",\n \"event_id TEXT\", \"subscription_id TEXT\", \"event_topic TEXT\",\n \"resource_type TEXT\", \"resource_id TEXT\", \"resource_state TEXT\",\n \"job_id TEXT\", \"order_id TEXT\", \"channel_id TEXT\", \"channel_name TEXT\",\n \"company_ext_id TEXT\", \"external_job_id TEXT\", \"occurred_at TEXT\",\n \"posting_count INTEGER\",\n];\n\nlet dbPromise: Promise | null = null;\nlet lastError: string | null = null;\n\nasync function db() {\n if (!dbPromise) {\n dbPromise = (async () => {\n // Val-scoped database. Do not switch this to std/sqlite/global.ts — it\n // would point the val at a different database.\n const { sqlite } = await import(\"https://esm.town/v/std/sqlite/main.ts\");\n await sqlite.execute(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ${TABLE} (\n id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n received_at TEXT NOT NULL,\n label TEXT NOT NULL,\n method TEXT NOT NULL,\n query TEXT NOT NULL,\n kind TEXT NOT NULL,\n tags TEXT,\n answered INTEGER NOT NULL,\n headers TEXT NOT NULL,\n body_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,\n body_len INTEGER NOT NULL\n )`);\n // Additive migrations. Each is independent so a re-run is harmless.\n for (const col of EXTRA_COLS) {\n try {\n await sqlite.execute(`ALTER TABLE ${TABLE} ADD COLUMN ${col}`);\n } catch { /* already present */ }\n }\n // Backfill rows captured before env/topic existed: those labels carry no\n // \"/\" prefix. The two local smoke tests are marked 'test'.\n await sqlite.execute(\n `UPDATE ${TABLE} SET env = CASE\n WHEN label IN ('selftest','opaque-test') THEN 'test' ELSE 'stg' END,\n topic = label\n WHERE env IS NULL AND label NOT LIKE '%/%'`,\n );\n return sqlite;\n })().catch((e) => {\n dbPromise = null; // let the next request retry the import\n throw e;\n });\n }\n return dbPromise;\n}\n\nfunction toB64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n let s = \"\";\n const CHUNK = 0x8000;\n for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += CHUNK) {\n s += String.fromCharCode(...bytes.subarray(i, i + CHUNK));\n }\n return btoa(s);\n}\n\n/** Best-effort JSON parse. Binary or encrypted bodies simply won't parse. */\nfunction tryJson(bytes: Uint8Array): any | null {\n try {\n return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder(\"utf-8\", { fatal: true }).decode(bytes));\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n}\n\nfunction json(body: unknown, status = 200) {\n return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {\n status,\n headers: { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" },\n });\n}\n\n/** Length-independent compare, so a wrong token leaks nothing through timing. */\nfunction tokenEq(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n if (!a || !b || a.length !== b.length) return false;\n let diff = 0;\n for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);\n return diff === 0;\n}\n\nfunction b64uToBytes(s: string): Uint8Array {\n const b64 = s.replace(/-/g, \"+\").replace(/_/g, \"/\") + \"=\".repeat((4 - s.length % 4) % 4);\n return Uint8Array.from(atob(b64), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));\n}\n\n/**\n * Which environment's webhook secret validates this JWT?\n * Returns the env suffix of the matching SECRET_ var, \"none\" if a token was\n * present but matched nothing, or null when no secrets are configured.\n */\nasync function signatureEnv(authorization: string | null): Promise {\n const jwt = (authorization ?? \"\").replace(/^Bearer\\s+/i, \"\");\n const parts = jwt.split(\".\");\n if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n\n const candidates: [string, string][] = [];\n for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(Deno.env.toObject())) {\n if (k.startsWith(\"SECRET_\") && v) candidates.push([k.slice(7).toLowerCase(), v]);\n }\n if (!candidates.length) return null;\n\n const msg = new TextEncoder().encode(`${parts[0]}.${parts[1]}`);\n let sig: Uint8Array;\n try {\n sig = b64uToBytes(parts[2]);\n } catch {\n return \"none\";\n }\n for (const [env, secret] of candidates) {\n try {\n const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n \"raw\", new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n { name: \"HMAC\", hash: \"SHA-256\" }, false, [\"verify\"],\n );\n if (await crypto.subtle.verify(\"HMAC\", key, sig, msg)) return env;\n } catch { /* try the next candidate */ }\n }\n return \"none\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the correlation keys out of a parsed event envelope.\n * `resource.occurred_at` is preferred over the attribute-level one: it is UTC,\n * whereas `attributes.occurred_at` carries a local offset, and only the former is\n * safe to sort on. Delivery order does NOT match occurrence order.\n */\nfunction correlate(parsed: any): Record {\n const a = parsed?.data?.attributes ?? {};\n const r = a.resource ?? {};\n const postings = Array.isArray(r.postings) ? r.postings : null;\n return {\n event_id: parsed?.data?.id ?? null,\n subscription_id: a.subscription_id ?? null,\n event_topic: Array.isArray(a.topics) ? a.topics[0] ?? null : null,\n resource_type: r.type ?? null,\n resource_id: r.id ?? null,\n resource_state: r.state ?? null,\n job_id: r.job_id ?? null,\n // A posting carries order_id directly; an order event carries its own id.\n order_id: r.order_id ?? (r.type === \"order\" ? r.id ?? null : null),\n channel_id: r.channel_id ?? null,\n channel_name: r.channel_name ?? null,\n company_ext_id: r.company_id ?? null,\n external_job_id: r.external_job_id ?? null,\n occurred_at: r.occurred_at ?? a.occurred_at ?? null,\n posting_count: postings ? postings.length : null,\n };\n}\n\nexport default async function (req: Request): Promise {\n const url = new URL(req.url);\n const path = url.pathname;\n const readToken = Deno.env.get(\"READ_TOKEN\") ?? \"\";\n const pathToken = Deno.env.get(\"HOOK_PATH_TOKEN\") ?? \"\";\n\n // ---- health -------------------------------------------------------------\n if (path === \"/\" || path === \"\") {\n let storage = \"ok\";\n try {\n await db();\n } catch (e) {\n storage = `error: ${String(e)}`;\n }\n const secrets = Object.keys(Deno.env.toObject())\n .filter((k) => k.startsWith(\"SECRET_\")).map((k) => k.slice(7).toLowerCase()).sort();\n return json({\n ok: true,\n storage,\n configured: { read_token: !!readToken, path_token: !!pathToken, secrets },\n last_write_error: lastError,\n });\n }\n\n // ---- read-back ----------------------------------------------------------\n if (path === \"/events\" || path === \"/stats\") {\n if (!tokenEq(req.headers.get(\"x-read-token\") ?? \"\", readToken)) {\n return json({ error: \"forbidden\" }, 403);\n }\n try {\n const sqlite = await db();\n if (path === \"/stats\") {\n const grouped = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT env, kind, event_topic, resource_state, sig_env,\n COUNT(*) AS n, MAX(received_at) AS latest\n FROM ${TABLE} GROUP BY env, kind, event_topic, resource_state, sig_env\n ORDER BY env, kind, event_topic`,\n );\n const orders = await sqlite.execute(\n `SELECT env, order_id, external_job_id, COUNT(*) AS events,\n COUNT(DISTINCT resource_id) AS resources, MIN(occurred_at) AS first_at\n FROM ${TABLE} WHERE order_id IS NOT NULL\n GROUP BY env, order_id, external_job_id ORDER BY first_at`,\n );\n const total = await sqlite.execute(`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM ${TABLE}`);\n return json({\n total: total.rows?.[0]?.n ?? 0,\n breakdown: grouped.rows ?? [],\n by_order: orders.rows ?? [],\n last_write_error: lastError,\n });\n }\n // Filters compose: env, order, resource, topic, kind, job, since.\n const since = Number(url.searchParams.get(\"since\") ?? \"0\") || 0;\n const limit = Math.min(Number(url.searchParams.get(\"limit\") ?? \"50\") || 50, 200);\n const where = [\"id > ?\"];\n const args: unknown[] = [since];\n for (const [param, col] of [\n [\"env\", \"env\"], [\"order\", \"order_id\"], [\"resource\", \"resource_id\"],\n [\"topic\", \"event_topic\"], [\"kind\", \"kind\"], [\"job\", \"external_job_id\"],\n ] as const) {\n const v = url.searchParams.get(param);\n if (v) { where.push(`${col} = ?`); args.push(v); }\n }\n if (url.searchParams.get(\"nobody\")) {\n // Correlation view: skip the payload entirely, ordered by OCCURRENCE.\n const res = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT id, received_at, env, kind, event_topic, resource_type,\n resource_id, resource_state, order_id, channel_name,\n external_job_id, occurred_at, posting_count, sig_env, body_len\n FROM ${TABLE} WHERE ${where.join(\" AND \")}\n ORDER BY COALESCE(occurred_at, received_at) ASC LIMIT ?`,\n args: [...args, limit],\n });\n return json({ events: res.rows ?? [], last_write_error: lastError });\n }\n const res = await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `SELECT * FROM ${TABLE} WHERE ${where.join(\" AND \")}\n ORDER BY id ASC LIMIT ?`,\n args: [...args, limit],\n });\n // std/sqlite returns rows as keyed objects, so decode the JSON columns\n // rather than indexing positionally.\n return json({\n events: (res.rows ?? []).map((r: any) => ({\n ...r,\n answered: !!r.answered,\n tags: r.tags ? JSON.parse(r.tags) : null,\n headers: JSON.parse(r.headers),\n })),\n last_write_error: lastError,\n });\n } catch (e) {\n return json({ error: String(e) }, 500);\n }\n }\n\n // ---- recording path -----------------------------------------------------\n // Shape: /h///. Everything from here on returns 200.\n const seg = path.replace(/^\\/+/, \"\").split(\"/\");\n const authorized = seg[0] === \"h\" && tokenEq(seg[1] ?? \"\", pathToken);\n if (!authorized) {\n // Deliberately indistinguishable from a successful delivery: an unauthorized\n // caller learns nothing about whether the path token was close.\n return json({ ok: true });\n }\n const rest = seg.slice(2);\n const label = rest.join(\"/\") || \"unlabelled\";\n // Two or more segments => /. A single segment is an un-namespaced\n // caller; record it rather than dropping it, but do not guess its environment.\n const env = rest.length >= 2 ? rest[0] : \"unknown\";\n const topic = rest.length >= 2 ? rest.slice(1).join(\"/\") : label;\n\n let bytes = new Uint8Array(0);\n try {\n bytes = new Uint8Array(await req.arrayBuffer());\n } catch { /* an empty/unreadable body still gets a 200 */ }\n\n const parsed = tryJson(bytes);\n const attrs = parsed?.data?.attributes ?? {};\n // Presence of a challenge value is the only reliable discriminator: the rest of\n // the envelope is not guaranteed to be present on a verification request.\n const challenge = attrs.challenge ?? parsed?.challenge ?? null;\n const kind = challenge ? \"verification\" : parsed ? \"event\" : \"opaque\";\n const tags = Array.isArray(attrs.topics) ? attrs.topics : null;\n const c = correlate(parsed);\n\n let sigEnv: string | null = null;\n try {\n sigEnv = await signatureEnv(req.headers.get(\"authorization\"));\n } catch { /* never let verification break the 200 */ }\n\n try {\n const sqlite = await db();\n await sqlite.execute({\n sql: `INSERT INTO ${TABLE}\n (received_at,env,topic,label,method,query,kind,tags,answered,sig_env,\n headers,body_b64,body_len,\n event_id,subscription_id,event_topic,resource_type,resource_id,\n resource_state,job_id,order_id,channel_id,channel_name,\n company_ext_id,external_job_id,occurred_at,posting_count)\n VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?,?)`,\n args: [\n new Date().toISOString(), env, topic, label, req.method, url.search, kind,\n tags ? JSON.stringify(tags) : null, challenge ? 1 : 0, sigEnv,\n JSON.stringify(Object.fromEntries(req.headers)), toB64(bytes), bytes.length,\n c.event_id, c.subscription_id, c.event_topic, c.resource_type, c.resource_id,\n c.resource_state, c.job_id, c.order_id, c.channel_id, c.channel_name,\n c.company_ext_id, c.external_job_id, c.occurred_at, c.posting_count,\n ],\n });\n lastError = null;\n } catch (e) {\n lastError = `${new Date().toISOString()} ${String(e)}`;\n }\n\n if (challenge) return json({ challenge });\n return json({ ok: true });\n}\n","createdAt",["D",1788779728742],"branchVersion","branchId","b61392f2-6e58-403f-b412-c1385e355511","id","13669511-c011-4ee2-a723-480fc1ee7082","webhook-recorder",["D",1788766946915],"deletedAt","legacyEnvVars","privacy","public","httpPrivacy","description","Lossless webhook capture endpoint for inspecting deliveries","imageUrl","9797ffd6-4e86-4792-aef0-da2c78219414","pinnedFileId","pinPreview",true,"pinMigrated","screenshotVersion","likeCount",0,"orgId","01a07ac3-13e0-7077-9325-0f25c08474da","tursoName","13669511c0114ee2a723480fc1ee7082","tursoHostname","13669511c0114ee2a723480fc1ee7082-val-town.aws-us-east-2.turso.io","tursoMeasuredAt",["D",1789547455787],"pinned","userPerm","r","valPerm","blobPerm","rw","emailPerm","sqlitePerm","projectPerm","telemetryPerm","user",{"_99":98,"_106":101},"org",{"_99":98,"_100":101,"_102":101,"_18":55,"_103":104,"_105":25},"branch",{"_13":88,"_32":89,"_43":42,"_90":44,"_91":-5,"_92":-5,"_93":-5,"_94":-5,"_95":-5,"_96":45,"_97":98},"isOwned",16,"main","projectId","forkedBranchId","forkedBranchVersion","forkedProjectPrivacy","forkedProjectId","forkedProjectOrgId","projectName","userHandle","Giani","handle","displayName","","avatar","tier","free","canRestrictVals","profileImageUrl","branchName","adoptOrgId",{"_43":44,"_32":45,"_38":153,"_47":-5,"_48":25,"_49":50,"_51":50,"_52":53,"_54":-5,"_18":55,"_56":31,"_57":58,"_59":-5,"_60":-5,"_61":62,"_63":64,"_65":66,"_67":68,"_69":154,"_71":-5,"_72":73,"_74":73,"_75":76,"_77":76,"_78":76,"_79":73,"_80":73,"_81":155,"_83":156,"_85":157,"_87":25},"tree",[148],"files",[148],"counts",{"_136":62,"_137":138,"_139":62,"_140":141,"_142":143},"contents",[128],"upstreamProject","upstreamBranch","emptyEnvVars","flags",[],"hasHttpFiles","grants","orgs","customDomains",{},{"_43":129,"_32":28,"_30":31,"_130":-5,"_41":42,"_40":14,"_131":25,"_38":132,"_13":133,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_24":25,"_134":-5,"_27":135},"c5d9fcb6-4eeb-4001-8f74-0db7a12db839","parentId","latest",["D",1788779728742],8,"label",[28],"pulls","branches",1,"forks","envVars",{"_144":146,"_147":62},"connections",{"_144":62,"_145":62},"count","unfilledCount",4,"emptyCount",{"_43":129,"_32":28,"_30":31,"_130":-5,"_41":42,"_40":14,"_131":25,"_38":149,"_13":133,"_33":34,"_35":37,"_24":25,"_134":-5,"_150":151,"_27":152},["D",1788779728742],"children",[],[28],["D",1788766946915],["D",1789547455787],{"_99":98,"_106":101},{"_99":98,"_100":101,"_102":101,"_18":55,"_103":104,"_105":25},{"_13":88,"_32":89,"_43":42,"_90":44,"_91":-5,"_92":-5,"_93":-5,"_94":-5,"_95":-5,"_96":45,"_97":98},"ctx",{"_81":-5,"_125":191,"_192":193,"_194":195,"_196":25,"_197":25,"_198":25,"_199":58,"_200":-5,"_201":-7,"_202":-7,"_203":62,"_204":25,"_205":25,"_206":-5,"_207":25,"_208":25,"_209":25,"_210":-5},"ENV",{"_162":163,"_164":165,"_166":89,"_167":168,"_169":170,"_171":172,"_173":174,"_175":176,"_177":178,"_179":180,"_181":182,"_183":184,"_185":186,"_187":188,"_189":190},"REACT_APP_SENTRY_DSN","https://586020d86f05489db63a554690acf1e9@o1398359.ingest.sentry.io/6724499","RENDER_GIT_COMMIT","e87eb04e707cf64e7e532c8e8ec395f209e17f15","RENDER_GIT_BRANCH","POSTHOG_API_TOKEN","phc_nmoyuAkStEZuUp69rYlg1DZgrIt19Gx0Y4Hwf8tGgJP","POSTHOG_API_HOST","https://wart.val.town","WEB_API_TEMPLATE","https://{val}.web.val.run","APP_URL","https://www.val.town","MODULE_URL","https://esm.town","VANITY_WEB_API_TEMPLATE","https://{label}.val.run/","DENOLS_URL","https://lsp.val.town","NODE_ENV","production","CLOUDFLARE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY","0x4AAAAAACtaIZJH7s9rBMZ6","GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID","875989696899-jtsqkhlbdv5jrlsk8631p7ipjg3c6o62.apps.googleusercontent.com","STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY","pk_live_51N2zvWEpZTTLipIkVEwXrUG9AT0yeOOEYxszarZT1jpsZV58Ly6wlg3SltZpHN26CUalOBmUSY7adQRQiSkCZz2500qSXNkf8Y","API_URL","https://api.val.town",[],"preferencesKeybindings","default","preferencesTheme","light","preferencesFixers","preferencesCopilot","preferencesSelectionAi","preferencesCloseBrackets","preferencesChatPanelState","preferencesDprint","preferencesDenofmt","notificationCount","flagDenols","isBusinessOrgMember","businessOrgHandle","isBusinessOrgAdmin","isHigherTownieTier","navCollapsed","currentOrgId"]

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